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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
I. Introduction
A great deal has been said about textual fidelity in constitu-
tional jurisprudence recently.1 It is certainly possible to found
one's constitutional jurisprudence on something other than the
written text of the Constitution; indeed it is possible to have
constitutional law without a fundamental written text, as is the case
in the United Kingdom. Moreover, even with a written text, it is
possible to argue that the text should not be determinative, or at
least not exclusively so. It is even possible that the text cannot be
determinative in all things; quite possibly the text is silent on
certain matters with which the nation must deal.2 As the United
States of America has chosen to have a written Constitution,
however, the words as written must be given some weight or the
whole exercise of having a written Constitution is pointless. In the
dominant jurisprudence of the day, in fact, there is a great
emphasis on fidelity to the words as written. Thus, when Justice
Scalia wrote, "I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain
meaning of a text, '' 3 the tone was proud, even boastful.
The current emphasis on strict textual readings has provided
a perspective with which to criticize such decisions as Roe v. Wade4
and Griswold v. Connecticut5 as highly imaginative impositions of
current judicial evaluations about what rights people should have
and what limitations should be place on government.6 What then,
would a jurist who says that he is "inclined to adhere closely to the
plain meaning of a text" make of a statement such as the following:
What we said ... was, essentially, that the [First, Fourth and
Fifth] Amendments [are] important not merely for what [they]
say . . . but for what [they] reflected: a consensus that the
1. For example, an entire issue of a volume of the Fordham Law Review was devoted
to reports of a symposium on Constitutional textual fidelity. See Symposium, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1249 (1997).
2. In other words, there may be matters about which the government must make a
decision, and no decision that is made can be predicated on any part of the text of the
Constitution no matter how broadly that document is read.
3. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184
(1989).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. Just to cite one prominent example of such criticisms, see ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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doctrine of [privacy], was part of the understood background
against which the Constitution was adopted .... '
This language appears to be the sort one expects to find in, say,
Griswold, and to be open to the criticism of the textually pure. In
fact, it is a paraphrase of something Justice Scalia himself wrote
about the Eleventh Amendment (not the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments) and the doctrine of sovereign immunity (not
privacy). That language appears in the dissent in a case that has
since been overruled, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,8 a decision
creating a significant exception to exceptionally broad immunity the
Eleventh Amendment as now interpreted gives to the states.
Although the paraphrased language was part of a dissent, it
represents the orthodox view of the Eleventh Amendment, which
is that the specific language of the text is irrelevant. In fact, the
decision in Union Gas was overruled9 because of that orthodox
view of the Eleventh Amendment, held by a majority of justices,
that does more than interpret the text of the Eleventh Amendment
expansively, it ignores that text altogether.
Something odd and inconsistent is taking place here, a
jurisprudence in contradiction. The purpose of this article is to
examine this inconsistency; its historical roots and current manifes-
tation; its justifications, especially stare decisis; its effects, and its
possible causes. Ultimately, apart from what we learn about
Eleventh Amendment, we can learn something as well about the
selective use of textual fidelity.1" The Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence shows that reliance on the text is used simply
to support particular goals unrelated to the text, including a limited
view of personal rights and a more expansive view of governmental
authority, especially for states. Moreover, a more expansive view
7. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of
course, the bracketed language shows language replacing what Justice Scalia said about the
Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity with what our imagined justice
said about the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the doctrine of privacy. For the language
quoted properly, see note infra and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. Union Gas was overruled in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Seminole Tribe is discussed at length infra Section VI.B.
10. This article is not an argument for textualism per se but begins with the premise
that, if the text matters, that text has been ignored in the process of achieving a result that
seems unjustifiable when considered on its merits apart from the constraints of text. In other
words, the text appears to have been ignored to make things worse, not better, than
application of the ancient text would require.
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of state authority supports the limitation of the rights of persons
and groups outside the dominant norms of the society.
II. The Eleventh Amendment Today: Why Bother Reading It?
As Justice Stevens acknowledged a decade ago, "this Court's
decisions make clear that much of our state immunity doctrine has
absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power contained
in the Eleventh Amendment.""1 That doctrine also has very little
to do with simplicity. While the actual text of the Eleventh
Amendment will be discussed in detail below,12 it is worth setting
it forth in full here:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecut-
ed against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.13
The Amendment's language is straightforward and concrete, with
none of the grand abstractions that have been the object of much
constitutional debate, for example, phrases like "due process of
law," or "cruel and unusual punishment."14 Yet that straightfor-
ward language has been ignored. Despite the Amendment's
specific prohibition only of suits against a state by citizens of other
states, it has been held also to bar suits by citizens against their
own states,15 a result that easily could have been stated in the text
if it had been intended. Although in the decades right after the
Amendment was adopted it appeared that the Amendment was not
understood to bar suits by foreign nations against states,16 in this
century it has been held to bar such suits. 7 Furthermore, al-
though it seems reasonable that if we are one nation joined in a
federal system, a federal court ought to be the appropriate place to
hear a dispute between a subordinate sovereign, a state, and
another entity considered to have sovereign powers-one of the
First Nations, with the status of a federally recognized "Indian
11. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
12. See infra Section III.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, and VIII.
15. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see also infra text on page 36 for a
description of how the Eleventh Amendment would have been written if its scope included
the result in Hans.
16. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
17. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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tribe"-those suits too are barred. 8  Even suits between First
Nations and states concerning the borders between them are barred
from the courts of the sovereign power that established those
borders in the first place.19
On the other hand, the Court has tried to ameliorate the
effects of its overly broad, textually unconstrained version of the
Eleventh Amendment. Most significantly, the Court held early in
this century in Ex parte Young that federal actions against state
officers who violate federal law are acceptable, as long as they are
suits for prospective relief rather than damages actions that might
drain the state treasury.2" The theory was that such suits were not
against the state because no state would authorize its officers to
violate federal law, and therefore such acts were ultra vires.21
That doctrine, an obvious fiction, has allowed suits under Section
1983 of Title 42 alleging that state actors violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights to be heard yet in those same cases, the suit
could not go forward if the state officers' "ultra vires" acts were not
at the same time "state action., 22 Moreover, the Court has long
recognized that prospective relief can be very costly to state
treasuries, as draining as actions for damages. 23 Now, the doctrine
of Ex parte Young is being recast as balancing test between the
competing interests of state sovereignty and federal supremacy,24
with all the irritating imprecision such tests imply. It may even be
recast entirely as a bar to federal court litigation unless no state
remedy for the wrong exists. 2 As another ameliorative doctrine,
the Court has first introduced,26 then repudiated,27 at least in
18. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
19. See Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
20. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)
(Ex parte Young leads to "the 'well-recognized irony' that an official's unconstitutional
conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment.").
23. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 347-49 (1979).
24. See Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 106; see also Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
261, infra notes 296-309 and accompanying text.
25. See Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261.
26. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (introducing the abrogation doctrine
for when Congress acts under the Fourteenth Amendment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491
U.S. 1 (1989) (extending that doctrine to Congressional acts under the Commerce Clause)
discussed infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
27. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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part, a doctrine that when Congress acts under a specific enumerat-
ed Constitutional power it can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.
In sum, the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment suffers
from excessive complexity and a collapse of reliable precedent. It
does so because that jurisprudence, a century ago, abandoned the
words of the Eleventh Amendment. This occurred, in part, because
the text, though specific, is also equivocal, capable of two different
readings. One reading is available only when the Amendment is
read in context, as intended to edit the several grants of federal
jurisdiction in Article III. That reading this article calls "the
contextual reading., 2 8 The other reading is the "acontextual" one,
which reads the Amendment in isolation. The acontextual reading
yields results that tend to be seen as anomalous or absurd.29 The
Court long ago chose the acontextual reading, and recoiled from
the absurd results. This led to the development of a "parallel"
Eleventh Amendment, dependent not on the text but on the
Court's views about the implicit principles the text only partially
exemplifies. At some point soon, however, the Court must
confront its textual infidelity and attempt to rationalize its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.
III. Textual Fidelity: Taking the Language Seriously
Every polity has its constitution; that is, in order to operate as
a polity is has its fundamental principles for operation. Most,
including ours, are constituted largely by tradition and shared belief
systems, but ours was among the first to have added a commitment
to a written text by which we measure political behavior, that
written text being therefore called the Constitution. On the whole
that was a good idea for a large and complex polity. What we have
committed ourselves to follow, however, is the written text and
what can be found in it, not what we think those who wrote the
text might have written if only their linguistic skills were greater,
and certainly not our conjectures about what they "meant."
It need not be the case that constitutional law-the law
concerning the foundational structures and boundaries of a
particular polity-be based on a written text. In the United States,
however, we have started with a written text, the Construction
(capitalized as a proper noun naming that doctrine) and therefore
28. See the discussion infra Section III.
29. See the discussion infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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our constitutional law is Constitutional law. That written text is not
perfect, because no document written by the hand of man could be;
undoubtedly it could be improved in all sorts of ways. Moreover,
at times basic political questions may arise that are constitutional
in nature, but are outside the scope of the Constitution no matter
how freely the document is read.
Most of the time, however, the text has something to say about
foundational issues. If we are to agree that, as lawyers and judges
in the United States, when we engage in constitutional litigation
and adjudication we are in some sense bound by the text of the
Constitution-that is, we engage in Constitutional law-we must
take fidelity to the text seriously. Being faithful to the text includes
reading it in context, and being sensitive to the differing ways in
which different parts of the text were phrased. Sensitivity to the
text includes being aware of when the words express concrete and
specific limitations or grants of power, and when the words are
open-ended, pointing beyond the text to some broader principles,
or to some need to search for broader principles. The history of
the Eleventh Amendment, unfortunately, shows how hard it has
been to be as sensitive to the text as is necessary.
A. The Spectrum of Specificity
One influential argument against the prevalent version of
"textual fidelity" in the Court's Constitutional jurisprudence is that
the Court has chosen to read clauses that are written quite
abstractly in an improperly concrete way. In so doing, the Court
has chosen to read those clauses as encrypted lists of concrete
prohibitions and requirements. 30  Thus, the Court's supposed
fidelity to the text actually betrays that text-in other words, by
reading the text to be concrete where it is abstract, the Court
betrays the very purpose of the Framers in using abstract language.
Moreover, this attempt to render the Constitution's more abstract
clauses into concrete intentions concerning specific cases leads the
interpreting court into a morass of undiscoverable "original
intent."'" Much of the Constitutional dispute in recent years has
30. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTrITUTON at 13-14 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW].
31. None of this discussion should be taken as rejecting the potential utility of historical
evidence about what was being said and thought about the Constitution in, for instance, 1789,
including evidence about expected results, scope of language and the like. This Article
makes some reference to such evidence. History of this sort can inform constitutional
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concerned how to read the more abstract clauses. It is not my goal
to enter that discussion, which has been extensive already, except
to note my agreement with those who hold that at best it is a
frustrating illusion, and at worst it is a lawyer's history, cynical and
malleable.
Anyone should be humbled by the daunting task of interpret-
ing the open-ended clauses of the Constitution. After all,
The Framers had a genius for studied imprecision and calculat-
ed ambiguity. They relied on generalized terms because
common-lawyers expressed themselves that way out of convic-
tion, because politics required compromise, and because
compromise required ambiguity.32
Ironically, the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence presents
an opposite but complementary problem, because the Court has
chosen to ignore specific and relatively concrete language in favor
of ill-defined principles that supposedly underlie those specific
terms.33 It is much less daunting than interpreting the open-ended
clauses to accept terms that are "concrete" and allow those
concrete limitations to control, even if they fail to fulfill fully the
principles the jurist herself believes undergird the specific terms.
That is, however, the task that the Court has failed with the
Eleventh Amendment, and it has done so in the name of the
original intent of the Constitution's Framers.
In repudiating the text of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
exemplifies the process by which emphasis on original intent is
faithless, not faithful, to the written Constitution. Professor Ronald
Dworkin recently stated in a symposium dedicated to the topic of
"Fidelity in Constitutional Theory" that
a great many constitutional scholars, including those who call
most loudly for "originalism," actually argue against textual
fidelity as a constitutional standard. They rely on other
analysis but should not (and cannot) control that analysis.
32. LEONARD WILLIAMS LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
350 (1988).
33. Throughout this Article's discussion of the Eleventh Amendment it is contended that
the Amendment is an example of fairly concrete, specific language rather than the grand
abstractions such as "due process" or "equal protection." That should never be taken to be
an argument that the Eleventh Amendment is well written. In fact, in one critical way it was
poorly written. When read in context, its literal and superficially univocal meaning becomes
ambiguous-that is, susceptible to two different meanings. Fatefully, the Court has chosen
the wrong one.
1999]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [104:1
standards and values as substitutes for fidelity. They rarely put
it that way. [Y]ou will find that substitution for fidelity is a
hidden subtext. Some scholars will argue that we should try to
discover, not what those who wrote or ratified the Constitution
and its various amendments meant to say, but what they
expected or hoped would be the consequence of their saying
what they did, which is a very different matter.34
The current Court's treatment of the Eleventh Amendment
confirms Dworkin's suspicions. The Court most often looks to
textual fidelity to make the abstract clauses into specific lists (lists
that tend to reflect a more limited view of individual rights than
might otherwise prevail). When, however, faced with fairly
concrete language, the Court has shown itself quite willing to
abandon the text altogether; and again, it is the rights of individuals
and groups of individuals3" to control the power over government
that suffers. Thus there is reason to take the few pages needed to
rehearse some of the issues surrounding originalism and textual
fidelity as those issues most normally arise.
Constitutional language varies greatly-some is open-ended
and some is not,36 some is quite abstract and some is fairly
34. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue
of Fidelity].
35. Those groups of individuals include, it should be noted, entities supposed to be
vested with some sovereign power of their own, although rarely allowed to exercise it-the
First Nations which are federally recognized tribes.
As Professor McAffee laments in a recent article, we tend to overlook "collective" (or
communal) rights. See Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original
Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17 (1998) [hereinafter Original
Understandings]. He has argued that both the structure of the Court and the Ninth
Amendment in particular protects "popular rights"-"rights that were held collectively by
the people as well as individually." See id., at 17 n.1; see also Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical
Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 61 (1996); Thomas B. McAffee, The
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990).
McAffee apparently holds, and probably the Framers held as well, the unexamined and
empirically unjustifiable view that states are better than the national government at serving
the collectively held popular rights, especially "rights of local self governance." See McAffee,
Original Misunderstandings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17 n.2. It is dubious that the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania provides any greater self-governance, and much greater sense of locality,
than the federal government does to persons like the author who reside there. The
language of the Ninth Amendment, however, itself reminds us that at bottom it is the people
who are sovereign. The people can and do make up a number of communities with
communal rights-especially the constitutionally recognized communities of the First Nations.
36. Even those who are committed to originalism, for instance Justice Antonin Scalia,
use the term "open-ended" to describe certain parts of the Constitution. See Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989) (referring to "open-ended
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concrete. Professor Dworkin's description of the Bill of Rights is
aptly applied to the entire Constitution: "On its most natural
reading, then, the Bill of Rights sets out a network of principles,
some extremely concrete, others more abstract, and some of near
limitless abstraction."37  One final variation in the language of
various clauses needs to be mentioned here, and noted for later
reference; some clauses are well written, while others, frankly,
could have been improved.
Many examples of the extremely concrete clauses have been
mentioned in recent literature given, perhaps the most common
being the requirement that the President be thirty-five years of
age.38 I will add another example; speaking of the President, it is
required that
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take
the following Oath or Affirmation: 'I do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'39
That is pretty specific language. It prescribes the exact wording of
the oath of office, and there is no need to look beyond those words
to find broader principles at stake.4  Much of the constitutional
contention, however, has been about portions of the Constitution
that fall more on the abstract side of the spectrum. Moreover,
some of the more abstract clauses, in essence, have been found to
be too abstract for any Supreme Court to feel comfortable
interpreting; for instance, the Court has refused to give any content
at all to the guarantee of a "Republican Form of Government" in
Article IV, Section 4.41
The open-ended clauses, however, demand content. It is true
that the Court has managed to avoid giving content to many of
these phrases, not just the guarantee of a "Republican Form of
textual provisions such as the Ninth Amendment.").
37. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 30, at 73.
38. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 34, at 1252.
39. U.S. CONsT. art II, § 1, cl. 8.
40. Of course, the words of the oath, with the parenthetical alternative wording,
exemplify a broader principle of religious tolerance-a member of the Society of Friends, for
instance, could not in good conscience swear an oath.
41. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (a decision now at its sesquicentennial




Government." For instance, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,42 which the Reconstruction
Congress "intended to serve as their greatest constitutional
monument,"'43 has in fact been largely ignored. On the other
hand, the Court could not and has not failed completely to give all
open-ended clauses content. Thus, for example, the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment have
done much of the work that the Reconstruction Congress may have
expected the Privileges and Immunities clause to do.' No matter
what one's approach to Constitutional jurisprudence, it is impossi-
ble to give content to the term "due process of law" without
looking to sources outside the text to give that term meaning. The
only questions can then be what outside sources, and what methods
of applying those sources, are legitimate and faithful to the way the
words are written.
To answer those questions one side of the current debate has
made a commitment to what it calls "originalism," which one
practitioner of that art once described as "plumb[ing] the original
understanding of an ancient text."45  That is, requiring "the
provisions of the Constitution [to] mean what the Founders
[whoever they may have been] intended them to mean."'  At
least three members of the current Court - Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Associate Justices Thomas and Scalia - have evidenced a
commitment to originalism.47 Moreover, their approach has been
influential on the Court as a whole.
While an appealing approach with a long pedigree, an
approach recently appropriated by conservatives but certainly not
their exclusive province,' "originalism" has serious problems and
many detractors. One response among many is that such original-
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. Bruce Ackerman, A General of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519, 1525 (1997).
44. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772 (1988).
45. Scalia, supra note 36, at 856.
46. Raoul Berger, New Theories of 'Interpretation': The Activist Flight from the Constitu-
tion, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1986).
47. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587,
1592 n.15 (1997); see also Scalia, supra note 36, at 862 ("I suppose I owe it to the listener to
say which of the two evils I prefer. It is originalism.").
48. See LEVY, supra note 32, at xii ("Until recently, original intent had no political
coloration"), xiii ("[Conservatives] give the impression the original intent analysis would
legitimate their own constitutional views on controversial questions, and they ignore the
extent to which original intent would undermine their own positions.").
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ism is a "kind of code or disguise, to the framers' own assumptions
and expectations about the correct application of those principles
[enunciated in the text itself]."49 "Originalism" is used to supplant
the text, which is indeterminate, with a specific list of results that
it seems plausible the founding generation would have liked-i.e.,
a conservative list, given we are talking about wealthy white men
of the ruling classes, many of whom owned slaves. Moreover, it
forces its practitioner into impossible quandaries. If what was
expected or intended matters, whose expectations matter? The
Convention in Philadelphia (and did they all expect the same
thing?), the state ratification conventions (and did they all expect
the same thing?), and are we able to prove any of that?5" What
do we make of the argument that the Founding Generation
themselves eschewed originalism and original intent?51 Finally,
assuming for the moment what is beyond the scope of this article,
that the Reconstruction amendments fundamentally changed the
distribution of power between state and federal governments and
the individuals who are citizens of both such governments, 52 then
must not we
ask not only what original intentions and understanding can be
ascribed to the Fourteenth Amendment per se, but also to ask
how its Framers and Ratifiers understood the original meanings
of 1787-88 .. .
It is not surprising that it has been said that "[A]cceptance of
original intent as the foundation of constitutional interpretation is
unrealistic beyond belief.,
54
Not only does originalism present a possibly undoable task, but
it betrays the Constitution and those who wrote it, because
We cannot make good sense of their behavior unless we assume
that they meant to say what people who use the words they
49. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 30, at 13.
50. See LEVY, supra note 32 (a 400 page exploration of these issues, reaching highly
skeptical conclusions about "original intent," its accessibility and utility).
51. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885 (1985). But see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77 (1988)(arguing that theory of interpretation based on
understandings of the Ratifiers emerged soon after ratification of the Constitution).
52. See, e.g, Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
53. Rakove, supra note 47, at 1591 n.9.
54. LEVY, supra note 32, at 322.
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used would normally mean to say - that they used abstract
language because they intended to state abstract principles.
They are best understood as making a constitution out of
abstract moral principles, not coded references to their own
opinions (or those of their contemporaries) about the best way
to apply those principles.55
We should take the language of the Constitution seriously. Where
that language is abstract and open-ended, one must accept the
invitation to reach out to supply the content, which is admittedly
a daunting task. In other words, if those who drafted the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment"
had a specific list in mind that would exhaust what would be cruel
and unusual punishment, they could have written that list.56
Many of our current Constitutional concerns might dissipate if
we understood the nature of our constitutional commitment. For
example, recent scholarship (in at least an indirect way in response
to funding from the National Rifle Association)57 has revived an
interest in what Professor Sanford Levinson has called the
"[e]mbarrassing Second Amendment."58  A growing wave of
commentary supports the "insurrectionist" view of the Amend-
ment's "original intent"-a "paranoic, anarchistic, and anti-
democratic" theory that believes the constitutionally elected
government can become the enemy, requiring an armed citizenry
to attack that government and its representatives if some portion
of that citizenry judged the government's actions wrong.59
Recently, a more interesting alternative view of the original intent
has been proposed-that the Second Amendment
was written to assure the Southern states that Congress would
not undermine the slave system by using its newly acquired
constitutional authority over the militia to disarm the state
militia and therefore destroy the South's principal instrument of
slave control.'
55. Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 34, at 1253.
56. See id. at 1257; see also Scalia, supra note 36, at 861-863 (addressing this same
clause).
57. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309, 318 n.37 (1998) (citing specific NRA grants to academics and NRA sponsorship
of law student essay contest).
58. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989).
59. See Bogus, supra 57, at 319-20.
60. Id. at 321.
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These two alternatives are unpalatable-either the original intent
behind the Second Amendment is repugnant, terrifying and grossly
unrealistic (the insurrectionist theory) or repugnant and obsolete
(the slave control theory). The mainstream view of the Amend-
ment's intent, the "collective rights" theory61 seems but a Bowd-
lerized version of the slave control theory - emphasizing the need
for state militia without acknowledging why - and to the average
person of the late twentieth century does not seem to speak to our
condition.
Given an intent that is repugnant, a commitment to original
intent seems to suggest that a time might come to repudiate a
commitment to the Constitution altogether. However, a commit-
ment to the text and the text alone, to what the words can be
reasonably read to mean, do not require such a radical step as
repudiation of commitment to the Constitution. Rather, it might
suggest that the Amendment, opaquely written as it is,62 does have
some effect, but not much in today's era. Full effect to the words
requires a focus on a "well-regulated militia," and that in turn
forces us to recognize that history has left the whole notion of a
militia largely behind. No matter the attempt to revive a militia, it
cannot be the same as it was in the era of muskets. The words of
the Second Amendment itself may render the Amendment
obsolete.63
This Article, of course, does not concern the Second Amend-
ment, and does not really concern the debate over "original intent."
It concerns the text of the Eleventh Amendment, and what it
would take to return to a faithful explication of that text rather
than what we have today, an explicit repudiation of the text as a
guide to legal behavior. More particularly, it concerns the Court's
transformation of a specific command into an abstract statement of
principle. Originalism not only has used the search for original
understandings in order to create specific lists to replace the grand
61. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see also Quillici v. Morton Grove,
695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
62. And, of course, all the provisions protecting slavery in the Constitution tend to
speak in codes and euphemisms.
63. Other portions of the Constitution are of course obsolete as well - the provision
euphemistically allowing the end the slave trade after 1808, see U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl.
1, remains in the Constitution but means nothing to us now; the entirety of Article VII
became obsolete when the Constitution was ratified; yet neither of these were "amended."
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abstractions like "du& process" or "equal protection," or to
determine the intent behind the Second Amendment. In the case
of more specific language like that of the Eleventh Amendment,
originalism has been used to turn specific prescriptions into much
broader abstractions. The justification has been that the specific
prescriptions only exemplify general principles the relevant
individuals in 1798 had about the nature of states' sovereignty, and
in turn their notions of what sort of immunity from suit a sovereign
should have.
As the most vocal originalist on the Court admits, this
"exceedingly difficult" job
requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmo-
sphere of the time - somehow placing out of mind knowledge
that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on
beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are
not those of our day.'
In all that immersion, it is easy to lose sight of the one thing the
drafters and ratifiers of any Constitutional provision clearly
intended to leave us-the words themselves. The average member
of Congress who voted for the Eleventh Amendment may have had
radically greater respect for states rights than we do today, as may
have the average member of the ratifying bodies in the states.
After all, they lived before the Civil War, and that war changed
everything, including our notion of ourselves as one nation, more
than a collection of different states joined through common
consent.65 The Eleventh Amendment, however, is not a statement
of grand principles of antebellum political theory. If it were, the
war and the Reconstruction Amendments might well have rendered
the earlier Eleventh Amendment obsolete. The Eleventh Amend-
ment, whatever the political ideologies that inspired it, was an
attempt to modify slightly the grants of specific jurisdiction to
federal courts made a few years before in the main text of the
Constitution. That is how it should be read.
64. Scalia, supra note 36, at 856-857.
65. A simple but telling example; before the Civil War, it was considered correct to say
"[t]he United States are...", using the plural form of the verb. Today, of course, we proudly
make such statements as "[t]he United States is the world's only remaining superpower,"




The Court not only has failed to be faithful to the text, but has
announced its decision not to be faithful in explicit terms. It is this
willful decision that confirms Dworkin's suspicions quoted earlier
in this section that the Court has substituted other values for
fidelity to the text.' Critically, it has sought after the chimera of
"plumbing original understandings" or, as it has put it in recent
Eleventh Amendment cases, seeking implicit principles that are
broader than what the drafters of that Amendment bothered to
write on paper.67 That is a mistake. The Court should not begin
with "implicit principles." It should begin with the words of the
Amendment, as well as how that bit of text fits into the architec-
ture and structure of the text of the Constitution as a whole. As
we have noted, some words are open-ended-they require a search
for content beyond the text. But other words most definitely do
not. Fidelity to the text requires recognizing the difference.
B. Reading the Specific Abstractly
A basic platitude of Constitutional interpretation is that a
judge ought to be faithful to the Constitution's text at one time or
another. Certainly, that commitment is not a recent innovation in
judicial restraint, but has been the touchstone of constitutional
jurisprudence since its beginning. Yet, the Court now openly
admits that the way it interprets the Eleventh Amendment has
little, if anything, to do with what that Amendment says.68 In fact,
it has little to do with anything the Constitution itself says any-
where.69 Rather, the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
purportedly derives from the Court's attempt to understand, not
the text of the Constitution, but the plan of the convention that
adopted it.7" Not only does that jurisprudence seem grounded in
something totally unrelated to the words of the Amendment, but
it is excessively complex, and shot full of avowed fictions.7 Even
worse, its jurisprudence, apart from its complexity and reliance on
66. See Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 34.
67. See, e.g., infra note 230 and Section VI.A.2.
68. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 32 (1989) (Scalia J., dissenting)
(discussing previous decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court's refusal to apply the
literal meaning of the Amendment).
69. See id. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
71. See infra Section IV.B.
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almost metaphysical sources, has had a pernicious effect. How,
then, has this state of affairs come about?
The Court's primary mistake, from which all others have
flowed, is its use of an open-ended interpretive technique ill-suited
to the text of the Eleventh Amendment. As the Court explained
over sixty years ago,
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the
words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and con-
trol. . . . There is the ... postulate that the States of the
Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be
immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has
been a "surrender of this immunity in the plan of the conven-
tion. ,
72
As discussed at length above, there are many clauses of the
Constitution that are open-ended, inviting the interpreter to look
well beyond the words themselves.73 The Eleventh Amendment
is not, however, an example of that sort of writing; as indeed many
other portions of the text are not. The text is quite specific about
who the parties to the barred litigation would be, although in other
ways it may not be so straightforward.
Once the Court chooses not to be limited to the text, it
purports to turn to the Constitution's architecture, to see what the
"plan" of the document as a whole, or rather the plan of the
convention that wrote the document, implies. In one recent foray
into the field, for instance, the plurality opinion explained that
The Court's recognition of sovereign immunity has not been
limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. To respect the broader concept of immunity, implicit in
the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amend-
ment as evidencing and exemplifying, we have extended a
State's protection from suit to suits brought by the State's own
citizens. [Citation omitted.] Furthermore, the dignity and
respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to
72. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi 292 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1934) (quoting
FEDERALIST No. 81. (Alexander Hamilton)) (footnote omitted).
73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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protect, are placed in jeopardy whether or not the suit is based
on diversity jurisdiction.74
The Court's assumption that the Eleventh Amendment
exemplifies a broader principle, that it is as it were the tip of an
iceberg, seems odd when one actually reads that Amendment and
compares it to Article III, which the Amendment so clearly is
intended to edit. Article III lists, rather specifically, ten types of
suits that may be brought in federal court. The Amendment quite
clearly addresses two of those types of suits-those between states
and citizens of other states or foreign nations-and limits the power
to those cases where the state brought the action. The editing may
have been a bit ambiguous-were all suits by those not citizens of
a state barred, or only those where the potential plaintiff's diverse
citizenship is the source of jurisdiction and there is no other?75
Ambiguous on that point or not, the text of the Amendment quite
clearly does not limit the right of, for instance, a citizen of
Pennsylvania to sue his own state if one of the other eight bases of
jurisdiction from Article III applies. It is equally clear that, if such
a result were wanted, it would have been quite easy to do so.76
Why was the Amendment written to give an "example" of one type
of suit that could not be brought, but that Amendment failed to
mention any of the other examples that were quite obvious to arise
from the text of Article III?
The Court thus has said that it is not bound by the terms of
the Eleventh Amendment because the Amendment points only to
a larger Constitutional implication of state immunity from suit.
The only way to check that conclusion, therefore, is to look at the
Constitution excluding the Eleventh Amendment, and see what if
anything suggests such immunity. It would, after all, be irreducibly
circular and also incoherent to argue that text of the Eleventh
Amendment can be ignored because the Amendment exemplifies
a principle that is found only in the Eleventh Amendment.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to jump directly to "principles"
and "broader concepts" without looking first at the words of the
74. Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997) (emphasis
added).
75. See the discussion of these two readings infra Section III; the first being identified
as the "acontextual reading", while the second is identified below as the "contextual"
reading.
76. See infra page 36 to view how the Amendment could have been written to state
specifically this broader state immunity from suit.
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Constitution. The implications of any document must be deter-
mined, at least for a start, by examining what it states explicitly.
IV. What the Eleventh Amendment Says: Text and Context
A. The Historical Context-Chisolm v. Georgia
The starting point, at least, of any interpretation of the
Constitution should be the text of the Constitution. The Eleventh
Amendment is unique in American Constitutional law, a change to
the fundamental law passed in response to the decision in a single
lawsuit. That decision, Chisolm v. Georgia77 came only four years
after the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, and arose out of a
very common problem-states that were not paying their debts.
The states incurred significant debts in the Revolutionary War, and
were having a hard time paying those debts, and were hiding
behind claims of sovereign immunity to avoid doing so.78 There
were several suits against the states for debts, but the Chisolm case
was the first to reach the Supreme Court. In the case, two citizens
of South Carolina sued the State of Georgia to collect a debt owed
an estate.79 The action was brought in assumpsit-that is, it was
an action for breach of contract.8"
The case was brought under the federal court's diversity
jurisdiction; there was no hint of a claim of a federal question.
The case is often read simply to explain what lead to the Eleventh
Amendment.82 For purposes of discussion of the Court's current
jurisprudence it also should be read to reveal the principles that
were implicit the Constitution as understood by leading members
of the Founding generation, since the current jurisprudence
77. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419 (1793).
78. See, e.g., Alan D. Cullison Interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 7-16 (1967); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19 (1963).
79. See Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 430.
80. See id.
81. As will be noted below, however, a federal question claim has been made in similar
cases, under the theory that repudiation of a debt is an unconstitutional impairment of
contract. See discussion of Hans v. Louisiana, infra, Section V.A.1.
82. The connection between Chisolm and the Eleventh Amendment is noted, see, e.g.,
DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 20 (1985); ALFRED H. KELLY
& WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 181 (5th ed. 1976); CARL BRENT
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 87 (2d ed. 1954).
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emphasizes the principles that preexisted the Eleventh Amendment
which that Amendment merely "evidenc[es] and exemplif[ies]."83
A fresh look at Chisolm, unencumbered with the problems of
modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, shows that the Court
was not primarily concerned with whether a citizen of South
Carolina could seek federal judicial assistance in a claim against
Georgia, but more how he could do so, what form of action to use,
and how the judgment could be executed. The Court asked the
litigants to answer the following four questions, and the last three
of them really turned on how to execute a money judgment on an
action at law:
1st. Can the State of Georgia, being one of the United States of
America, be made a party-defendant in any case, in the
Supreme Court of the United States, at the suit of a private
citizen, even although he himself is, and his testator was, a
citizen of the State of South Carolina?
2nd. If the State of Georgia can be made a party defendant in
certain cases, does an action of assumpsit lie against her?
3rd. Is the service of the summons upon the Governor and
Attorney General of the State of Georgia, a competent service?
4th. By what process ought the appearance of the State of
Georgia to be enforced?'
Justice Iredell noted that at common law, an action in assumpsit
could not be brought against the King,85 but that did not mean the
subject had no redress:
If any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the
King, he must petition him in his Court of Chancery, where his
Chancellor will administer right, as a matter of grace, though
not upon compulsion86
Justice Iredell further explained the procedure-when the petition
was presented to the King, the King would "indorse or underwrite,
soit droit sait al partie (let right be done to the party)" and at that
point, "the merits shall be determined upon issue or demurrer, as
in suits between subject and subject."'  Thus, the action could be
brought, but the execution of the judgment would not be "upon
83. See Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997).
84. Chislom, 2 U.S. at 420.
85. See id. at 438.
86. Id. at 442 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *203).
87. Id. at 442-443.
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compulsion." In other words, when one claims that the sovereign
owes one money, one cannot expect to have a sheriff's sale of the
sovereign's property to enforce that judgment.
While recognizing that concern, however, the Court found that,
as Justice Blair put it,
that if this Court should refuse to hold jurisdiction of a case
where a State is Defendant, it would renounce part of the
authority conferred, and, consequently, part of the duty
imposed on it by the Constitution; because it would be a refusal
to take cognizance of a case where a State is a party. Nor does
the jurisdiction of this Court, in relation to a State, seem to me
to be questionable, on the ground that Congress has not
provided any form of execution, or pointed out any mode of
making the judgment against a State effectual; the argument ab
in utili may weigh much in cases depending upon the construc-
tion of doubtful Legislative acts, but can have no force, I think,
against the clear and positive directions of an act of Congress
and of the Constitution."
As for the fear that a state would either be exempt from execution
because of course it could not be subject to some sort of judicial
sale of state property, Blair said:
Is it altogether a vain expectation, that a State may have other
motives than such as arise from the apprehension of coercion,
to carry into execution a judgment of the Supreme Court of the
United States, though not conformable to their own ideas of
justice?89
The issue for Blair, and apparently the Court's majority,9" was
whether the Constitution really formed one nation, in service of the
people of that nation, or was it to remain an ineffectual confedera-
cy of separate states in many ways unanswerable to anyone. After
all, that is the ultimate meaning of sovereignty-freedom from
answering to anyone else.9" As another member of the majority
88. Id. at 451.
89. Chislom, 2 U.S. at 452.
90. In 1793, the Court did not issue majority, dissenting and concurring opinions, but
rather each Justice stated his own views, and in essence a head count was needed to
determine the result.
91. See, e.g., J.W. ERLICH, ERLICH'S BLACKSTONE 66 (1969) ("First, the law ascribes
to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-eminence. The king is the vice regent and




in Chisolm, Justice Wilson, expressed what he viewed to be the
only theory of sovereignty consistent with the Constitution:
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVER-
EIGN, is totally unknown. There is but one place where it
could have been used with propriety. But, even in that place it
would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those,
who ordained and established that Constitution. They might
have announced themselves 'SOVEREIGN' people of the
United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided
the ostentatious declaration.'
The result in Chisolm outraged the states.93 There is evidence
that the result violated the understanding of Article III that many
were left with after the debates of the various ratifying conventions.
For instance, during the Virginia ratifying convention, when
discussing that clause of Article III which grants federal courts
jurisdiction over "controversies ... between a State and Citizens of
another State," opponents of ratification expressed the concern that
the State would be subject to all sorts of claims in federal court.94
The Constitution's advocates said that was irrational, as it was
understood that no state could be made a defendant, but only act
as a plaintiff.95 To the extent that discussion sheds any light on
what was done after Chisolm, it must be noted that the recorded
discussions only concerned diversity jurisdiction over states as
defendants.96
The holding in Chisolm, that a state could be brought into
federal court under that court's diversity jurisdiction to answer for
its debts to a citizen of another state, was repudiated soundly by
the Eleventh Amendment. Given that fact, what value can the
decision have in helping us interpret the post-Eleventh Amendment
Constitution? The answer is that it remains illuminating both in
aiding in the baseline interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment-if one's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment allows
a suit like Chisolm, then it is wrong-but also to remind us of what
the Constitution meant to the Founding generation before the
92. Chislom, 2 U.S. at 454.
93. See, e.g., DAVID CURRIE, supra note 82.
94. The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 527 (Jonathan Elliot ed.).
95. See id. at 554.
96. See discussion infra Section IV.C. concerning the connection of the text of the
Eleventh Amendment to Article III.
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Eleventh Amendment was enacted. This last point is important for
two reasons. First, the burden of establishing the meaning of an
amendment to the Constitution ought to be on the one who argues
for the most change to pre-existing jurisprudence. Second, and
more significantly, the Court has viewed its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence not to be bound by the text because the text only
"evidenc[es] and exemplif[ies]" "the broader concept of immunity,
implicit in the Constitution ... ." Chisolm reminds us that a
broader concept of immunity was not implicit in the Constitution
at all.
With that in mind, one can turn to the argument of the
Attorney General of the United States, Edmund Randolph, who
appeared in the argument on behalf of the private plaintiffs seeking
to sue Georgia. He of course wanted the Court to view the case as
one where it must find federal judicial power to enter a judgment,
so he compared his case-a diversity action on a debt where the
debtor happened to be a state-with cases where federal power he
felt the judicial power was obvious. He argued that if the Court
could not hear a case brought against a state, the Constitution
would fail:
If, for example, a State shall suspend the privilege of a writ of
habeas corpus, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it; should pass a bill of attainder or ex
post facto law; should enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; should grant letters of marque and reprisal;
should coin money; should emit bills of credit; should make any
thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts,
should pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts; should,
without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties on
imports or exports, with certain exceptions; should, without the
consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, or keep troops
or ships of war in time of peace; these are expressly prohibited
by the Constitution; and thus is announced to the world the
probability, but certainly the apprehension, that States may
injure individuals in their property, their liberty, and their lives;
may oppress sister States; and may act in derogation of the
general sovereignty.
Are States then to enjoy the high privilege of acting thus
eminently wrong, without controul; or does a remedy exist?
The love of morality would lead us to with that some check
97. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997).
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should be found; if the evil, which flows from it, be not too
great for the good contemplated.98
Remember, Attorney General Randolph represented the winning
side, and the side that had the principles implicit in the Constitu-
tion on its side. The Eleventh Amendment may have ended suits
by citizens of another state against a state in federal court,
assuming such suit is founded on that basis of jurisdiction alone,
but what justification exists for destruction of the rest of the
Constitutional scheme?
B. An Equivocal But Specific Clause
Although the Court has expressed an aversion to the text of
the Eleventh Amendment, it is necessary to take a close look at the
text of the Eleventh Amendment. After all, the Court also has an
avowed commitment to textual fidelity. At first blush, the words
of the Eleventh Amendment appear rather straightforward and in
relative terms concrete, rather an expression of grand abstractions.
The Eleventh Amendment, in its entirety, states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecut-
ed against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
The Amendment is a limit on the federal judiciary's power to hear
and decide certain kinds of cases. It prohibits federal judges from
deciding cases in which the defendant is a state, and the plaintiff is
a citizen of another state or another nation altogether.1" The
language is simple, specific and easy to apply."° If the State of
New Jersey is the plaintiff, the Amendment is irrelevant. If the
State of New Jersey is the defendant, one must look at the identity
of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey, another
state or another sovereign that is part of the United States,"°2 is
the United States, or is a foreign state, then the Amendment does
not apply. Only if the plaintiff is, for example, from Pennsylvania,
98. Chislom v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419, 421-22 (1793).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
100. See id.
101. It is, however, ambiguous - thus the two readings, the "acontextual" and the
"contextual."
102. For example, a "domestic dependent nation"-for example, a federally recognized
Native American tribe, one of the First Nations.
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does the Amendment apply. Or at least that is what the language
appears to say, and say rather unequivocally.
Yet, as the Court has observed, there appears to be an
anomaly in this language if applied this way. But for the Amend-
ment, a citizen of Pennsylvania might have two jurisdictional bases
for a suit against the state of New Jersey-what we normally call
"diversity of citizenship"'13 and also what we normally call a
"federal question." If the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit by
that citizen of Pennsylvania against the State of New Jersey, no
matter the jurisdictional basis, then the federal question suit is
barred as well as that founded on diverse citizenship. On the other
hand, while a citizen of New Jersey could not sue her own state
because of diverse citizenship, she would remain free to sue her
state if it violated federal law. Thus the anomaly; if New Jersey
violates federal law and hurts two persons, one a citizen of New
Jersey and one of Pennsylvania, only the former and not the latter
can bring suit in federal court.
One answer to this anomaly might be to accept it, recognizing
that a suit by a citizen against his own state for violating federal
law ought to be allowed even if it seems odd and unfortunate that
a foreign citizen cannot do so. The apparent inequity, however, has
disturbed the Court mightily. Thus, Justice Scalia expressed the
orthodox view when he wrote:
If this text were intended as a comprehensive description of
state sovereign immunity in federal courts - that is, if there were
no state sovereign immunity beyond its precise terms - then it
would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as
providing immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdic-
tion that it describes . . . ." For there is no plausible reason
why one would wish to protect a State from being sued in
federal court for violation of federal law ... when the plaintiff
is a citizen of another State or country, but to permit a State to
be sued there when the plaintiff is a citizen of the State itself.
[Thus, there must be some other constitutional principle beyond
the immediate text of the Eleventh Amendment].
10 5
103. As noted below, there actually is no single jurisdictional basis one could call
"diversity of citizenship" - there are several such bases; and that fact is a key to explaining
how to interpret the Eleventh Amendment.
104. As will be seen below, this article takes that position that this view is the one most
consistent with the text.
105. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Scalia wrote in dissent, his view not only was the orthodox one but the
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Justice Scalia notes the imbalance created by a "literal"
reading of the text-a state's own citizens can sue it for violating
federal law, but foreign citizens, who might have been thought by
the Founders to need even more protection from rogue state
action, cannot. To rectify that imbalance,10 6 one must either
ignore one point the Amendment appears to make-it bans all suits
by foreign citizens-or ignore another point it makes-it lists very
specific persons who cannot sue, while leaving the judicial power as
it extends to other types of persons alone. The Court has chosen
the latter course.
In other words, to give equitable effect to what apparently is
the case about the Eleventh Amendment's limits on judicial
power-that it includes all cases of any type against a state-the
Court has felt it necessary to ignore entirely what is undoubtedly
clear in the language, its specific list of what particular arrangement
of parties is forbidden. One might ask why, if one part or the
other of the language of the Eleventh Amendment is to be ignored,
why choose that path which will limit the rule of law most and
cause the enforcement of the Supremacy Clause most trouble?
On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that any part
of the Eleventh Amendment must be ignored at all. The Eleventh
Amendment is quite specific about the persons who are not
allowed to sue. When its language is compared with that of the
rest of the Constitution, however, especially the judicial article to
which it clearly referred, it does not appear, necessarily, to forbid
all suits by those persons. Rather, it might be read only to forbid
suits brought by those persons solely on the basis of their status
rather than the nature of the dispute-"diversity of citizenship"
suits rather than "federal question" suits.
This is not meant to be an argument that Justice Scalia was
wrong in identifying what he called the "literal" meaning of the
text. That reading is one of two plausible, available alternatives for
reading the Amendment without doing its text a disservice.
Unfortunately, the text at its core is ambiguous, and it does no
result he sought has not come about; as described infra Section VII, the Court overruled
Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
106. Of course, it is possible to simply accept the imbalance no matter how odd or unfair
it strikes the judge interpreting the Amendment-a position championed by many on the




good to speculate if that ambiguity was intentional or not. There
are two available meanings of the words taken at face value-and
Justice Scalia's arguably is the more obvious. The other, as
described below, has only in its favor greater congruence with the
Constitutional scheme and results that seem neither absurd nor
inequitable. The reading of the text the Court has adopted, which
looks to the Eleventh Amendment in isolation from the rest of the
text and interprets it to be a prohibition against any and all suits by
a foreign citizen, will be referred to as the "acontextual" reading
for the remainder of this Article. On the other hand, there is the
reading of the text that interprets the Amendment in the context
of the rest of the Constitution, especially Article III. That reading,
which will be referred to in this article as the "contextual" reading,
takes the Amendment to be a prohibition on such suits only when
diversity of citizenship is the sole basis of federal jurisdiction.
C. The Rest of the Text-Article III
The Eleventh Amendment's language refers back to Article
III, which establishes the federal judiciary and its jurisdiction. That
Article explain that, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity. . ." in several select instances. Thus, the first
several words of the Eleventh Amendment are a direct and nearly
verbatim reference to the beginning of Article III; again, the
Amendments's opening words are "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity . .." Article III states that the judicial power shall extend
to several instances. The Eleventh Amendment says, yes, but that
power shall not be construed or interpreted a certain way.
Notably, the Eleventh Amendment does not purport to change
Article III, but only prohibit a certain interpretation of it-the
interpretation that led to Chisolm. Its language, "shall not be
construed to extend," bespeaks a desire to avoid wholesale
disruption of the Constitutional scheme, a cautious respect for the
existing text that appears wholly lacking in current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.
Since the first words of the Article and the Amendment mirror
each other, it might prove fruitful to compare the rest of the
language in both to see if the latter continues to mirror the former.
Therefore, a closer look at the second section of the Article is in
order. There are ten separate phrases there, each setting forth a
different basis for the exercise of the federal judicial power. Note
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how that portion of Article III reads in its entirety, with the
addition of some numbering to set the phrases apart:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
[1] arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-[2] to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-[3] to all Cases of admirality and
maritime Jurisdiction;-[4] to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;--[5] to Controversies between
two or more States;-[6] between a State and Citizens of
another State;-[7] between Citizens of different States;-[8]
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, [9] and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, [10] [or foreign] Citizens
or Subjects."
Several items in this list explicitly create federal jurisdiction
over cases that involve states. The first phrase, before the first
semicolon and hyphen, gives federal judicial power over all cases,
without exception, that raise federal questions. That federal
judicial power might be entertained in an inferior federal court in
the first instance, or it might not be exercised until the United
States Supreme Court reviews the decisions of state courts, but it
exists. All the remaining phrases but one,' each contained
between sets of semicolons and hyphens, create federal judicial
power not based on the content of the case but the identity of the
parties. The list is quite long and specific, and we do it a great
disservice in reducing that listto the phrase "diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction."
In that list, suits between a state and some other entity show
up repeatedly. Of the ten grants of jurisdiction listed, states are
explicitly named as parties three different times. First, federal
power extends to suits between two or more states.10 9 Second,
that power extends to suits between a state and citizens of another
state.' Third, the federal judicial power extends to suits be-
tween one of the "States or its Citizens" and "foreign States,
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
108. See id. (the third phrase, makes admirality cases a federal matter).
109. See id.
110. See id. At this point, it is worth noting that this phrase is the only one of the ten




Citizens or Subjects." '' That last could be read as in fact two
different grants of power; one between states and foreign entities
and one between United States citizens and foreign entities. In
addition, Article III, section 2, clause 1 grants the federal judiciary
power to decide cases where "the United States shall be a Par-
ty,''112 and even the most diehard state sovereign immunity
advocate accepts that this grant of jurisdiction encompasses cases
where the United States is in litigation against a state. Finally,
federal question jurisdiction is granted over "all Cases," which at
least is more likely than not to suggest to any normal interpreter
cases involving states.1
To sum up, Article III contains ten distinct bases for the
assertion of federal judicial power. Three explicitly arise because
a state is a party. Two others normally would be found to include
suits in which states were parties. These two are federal question
cases and suits in which the United States is a party. In the
situation where the United States is a party, there has never been
a doubt that the states could be sued. As for federal question
jurisdiction, the language certainly contemplates all cases and there
was no implication elsewhere that "all cases" could not mean those
involving States. That last basis of jurisdiction is not based on who
the parties are, but something more important, the guarantee of the
rule of law.
Comparison of the Eleventh Amendment's language with
Article III, which it was intended to amend, shows that of the five
situations in which federal power had been granted to decide cases
involving States, only two were specifically limited by the Eleventh
Amendment; or rather, only two were made subject to an interpre-
tive rule which allows states to be parties, but not if they are the
defendant. Article III reads as follows, deleting all but the two
bases of jurisdiction amended by the Eleventh Amendment, the
sixth and ninth in the list above:
[a.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity...
[b.] between a State and Citizens of another State ...
111. Id.




[c.] and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects."4
The Eleventh Amendment adds a vociferous "but" to that grant of
power, saying, [Yes, but]
[a.] The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, [thus mirroring
the initial clause, with the italicized language making it clear the
Amendment is not meant to change the Article but to correct
errors in interpreting it]
[b.] commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, [thus making clear that the judicial
power for suits between states and citizens of other states was
not meant to include suits where the states were defendants, but
rather only those cases the state brings]
[c.] or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. [thus
making it clear that the judicial power established in the ninth
item listed in Article III, section 2 also applies only to suits the
states initiate]."
5
The Eleventh Amendment, in other words, establishes only its
interpretive rule to limit the scope of two of the ten grants of
jurisdiction found in Article III. The others, especially the federal
question grant, which is central to giving effect to the Supremacy
Clause, remain untouched.
Remember, an "amendment" is a change. Had the Eleventh
Amendment been incorporated directly into the text of Article III
to amend it, rather than being placed at back of the text of the
Constitution as an addition, Article III would have read as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
[1] arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-[2] to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-[3] to all Cases of admirality and
maritime Jurisdiction;-[4] to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-[5] to Controversies between
two or more States;-[6] between a State and Citizens of
another State; but it shall not be construed to extend to any suit
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State,-[7] between Citizens of different
114. Id.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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States;-[8] between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, [9] and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, [10] [or foreign]
Citizens or Subjects, but it shall not be construed to extend to
any suit commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.116
The Eleventh Amendment was the first amendment ratified that
was not an addition to the previous text (adding a list of rights not
addressed in the original text) but an actual change to its previous
terms. It was therefore the first to adopt the convention of
retaining the original text but adding to it contradictory instruc-
tions, an unfortunate practice.'17 That fact should not require us
to ignore that the Eleventh Amendment was a change to Article III
and can be read back into that text. The contextual reading is the
most sensible one; and that is especially the case when one
considers the broader context of the Constitution as it existed at
the time of the Amendment's inclusion in the text.
D. The Rest of the Text-The Constitution as a Whole
A look at the Constitution's architecture, to see what the
"plan" of the document as a whole might be, supports the reading
of the Eleventh Amendment that it limits only cases that arise
under one of two of the ten separate bases for jurisdiction in
Article III. That is to say, the plan of the Constitution as a whole
suggests that federal question jurisdiction is unaffected by the
Eleventh Amendment.
First, and most generally, the Supremacy Clause states that
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .. ."'
That clause does not in any way require that the states be open to
suit in federal court, of course. It does states an overall, very
116. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (with the addition of the author's bracketed
numbering of the bases of jurisdiction and, in italics, the language of the Eleventh
Amendment).
117. An easy example of this practice is the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments;
the former prohibited alcohol, the latter repealed the former; both remain part of the text
of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, amend. XXI.
118. U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2.
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general principle that should inform all constitutional interpreta-
tion-federal law is supreme in its sphere, state law is subordi-
nate-and for that principle to have any practical effect there must
be a place and time where any conflicts can be resolved once and
for all. The Supremacy Clause certainly does not suggest an overly
solicitous attitude toward states' immunity from suit.
The Supremacy Clause cannot be read in isolation. While it
says federal law is supreme, Article III suggests that federal
jurisdiction exists to ensure that result. The Article provides that
"the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority,
. .119 The italics in the preceding quote highlight what should
be obvious, the parallel between the laws that the Supremacy
Clause deems supreme and the power of the federal courts to
ensure that fact. Again, that grant of power does not require that
the states acquiesce to federal question suits, but if it contains any
suggestions of broader principle, it suggests that in a conflict
between a state's claim of immunity from suit and the demand for
a resolution of a federal question, the state should lose.
There are a number of powers given to the federal government
and taken from the states that, but for suits by entities other than
other states or the federal government,12 might be unenforceable.
There are a number of powers, of course, that would lead to a
direct confrontation of some sort between state and federal law,
where the federal government would be expected to be an active
participant in resolving the dispute-for instance, when and if a
state tried to declare war on a foreign country. There are others
where private litigants would be most likely to carry the burden.
For example, Congress has the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... ,,121 As recently as the summer of
1998 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case that
showed that states are fully capable of violating patents-and the
119. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (the first basis for federal jurisdiction of the ten listed)
(emphasis added).
120. The Court continues to recognize suits against the States by other States and the
federal government as exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment, although, it is hard to give
a principled reason why, once it abandoned the text of the Amendment in interpreting it.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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patent holder was forced to sue the state for doing so (and the
Federal Circuit was forced to try to get around the Eleventh
Amendment as it has been interpreted to allow that suit, using
what is at best dubious support for that action).'22 Similarly,
Congress has the power to "coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and
Measures."' 23 Should a state take that power to itself, for exam-
ple attempting in some way to regulate the exchange rate for
foreign currency, the most likely litigant to challenge that action
promptly would be private bankers or currency dealers or someone
else in the world of finance.
The Constitution explicitly prohibit the states from certain acts
as well, but it is hard to see how those prohibitions could be
enforced without private action. States are prohibited from
"pass[ing] any Bill of Attainder .... ,124 A bill of attainder, in
essence, is a legislative act to inflict punishment on a person the
legislature felt had acted wrongfully; such an act bypasses a trial
and sentencing. Thus, the punished person could not challenge the
state's unconstitutional action in a criminal trial in which the
accused was the defendant. The punished person's only hope
would be an action against the state that the accused herself
commenced and prosecuted, and the best forum for protection of
this federal right would be federal court. Should the punishment
involve imprisonment, that federal action might arise through the
writ of habeas corpus; if the punishment were a fine, an injunctive
proceeding against collecting it.'25
Still further, a state is prohibited from certain acts that might
draw direct federal attention, but then again might not:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
122. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148
F.3d 1343 (3d Cir. 1998), discussed infra at notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
123. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5.
124. !d., § 10, cl. 1.
125. None of these examples is to say current Eleventh Amendment doctrine does not
provide mechanisms by which the state may be stopped in federal court; as, for example, the
doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) would allow an injunctive suit against the
state official collecting the fine (or maybe not, if Justice Kennedy's new version of the Young
doctrine were to prevail). See the discussion infra notes 266-269. All these examples merely
point out that, before the Eleventh Amendment, the "plan of the convention" appears to




absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws; and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress.126
In other words, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not
impose an extra tariff on goods coming into the port of Philadel-
phia. If Pennsylvania did so, however, the first to complain, and
the first to sue, would be the exporters and importers who were
affected.
The private suits against the states suggested above might well
fall under the various ameliorative doctrines and fictions (for
example, the Ex Parte Young doctrine or the abrogation doc-
trine)'27 that exist to soften the blow of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The point here, however, is that all those portions of the
Constitution that give rise to those suits in a federal court are
evidence of the structure of the Constitution as a whole, and
provide a context for reading the Eleventh Amendment. That
context suggests that the Amendment should be read as amending
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to prohibit suits brought against
states under that jurisdictional basis alone, but not affecting federal
question suits.
In any event, the contextual reading of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is at least one of the three that is possible. These three, are,
first, to read the text in a wider sense, recognizing its connections
with the rest of the text of the Constitution, and its context as well.
If one does so, one will conclude that the Amendment, absent
years of encrusted precedent, limited two of ten jurisdictional
grants in Article III and left the others alone. If a foreign citizen
tries to sue a state, that Article cannot be construed to grant
jurisdiction; but if that foreign citizen raises a federal question, that
question is the source of jurisdiction, and her citizenship is
incidental.
Alternatively, one can read the text faithfully but in isolation,
ignoring the rest of the Constitutional text, using the "acontextual"
reading. If one does that, one probably should find the Amend-
ment, for whatever reasons, has demanded that we not interpret
Article III to allow a foreign citizen to sue a state in federal court.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
127. These doctrines are discussed infra Section V. B.
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On the other hand, if a jurisdictional basis otherwise exists, a state's
own citizens, other sovereigns within the United States (specifically,
the First Nations), the United States itself, or foreign nations can
all bring suit. If that is one's reading of the Eleventh Amendment,
one must accept the inconsistencies to which Justice Scalia alluded
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.128 There are worse imbalances in
our Constitutional structure.
Finally, one can abandon the text altogether in an attempt to
be consistent with a presumed, pre-existing principle of state
sovereign immunity. To do so reduces the Eleventh Amendment
to yet another example of speaking in code. While some open-
ended clauses are read as code words for lists of easily stated and
relatively narrow rules,1 29 allowing the Court to replace the text
with its preferences, now even the very specific language of the
Eleventh Amendment is read to mean something else altogether-
the more general principle of state sovereign immunity. Yet if the
open-ended clauses, such as the Due Process clause and the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, show anything, they
show that the Founding generation could easily have written the
Eleventh Amendment in broad, sweeping terms. For example, the
Eleventh Amendment could have been written as follows:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to disparage the States' retained immunity as sovereign from
suits commenced or prosecuted against them.
Of course, such open-ended language would have left open the
question of what the states' retained immunity as sovereign might
be. The history of the Eleventh Amendment since its passage, and
especially in the last decade appears to be an attempt to answer
that question, rather than to interpret what is written in the text.
V. Forgetting the Lyrics: Slowly Leaving the Text Behind
Over time, traditional folk songs diverge radically, so that we
often speak of the different versions of a song. Without an
authoritative text on which to rely and against which to judge, no
one version is more correct than another. As the versions diverge,
128. See supra note 105 and accompanying text discussing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S.1, 31 (1989).
129. See supra Section III.A., particularly the description of the dispute between




it sometimes becomes impossible for anyone but a trained expert
to understand that two different versions are in some sense the
same song. For most purposes, of course, the two versions are not
the same.
One would think that law founded on a specific written text,
unlike folk songs, would not have the same tendency to develop
variants. As the Supreme Court began late in the last century to
distrust the authority of the text of the Eleventh Amendment,
however, the Court began to create a new version of the Amend-
ment. Like differing versions of folk songs, it is difficult to see the
current "parallel" Eleventh Amendment as related to what is
written in the text of the Constitution.
A. The "Parallel" Amendment-State Immunity Expands
The Court managed nearly a century under the Eleventh
Amendment before confronting in a significant way the language
of the Amendment. In the latter part of the nineteenth century,
however, the Court found itself unable to accept the implications
of the acontextual reading of the text, yet failed to consider that
this required that it accept another, more sensible reading of the
text. Instead, the Court embarked on a process that continues to
the present. It began to craft an entirely new, "parallel" Eleventh
Amendment. In creating the parallel Amendment, the Court began
to view what was written not as a specific set of exceptions to an
earlier specific list of granted judicial power. Rather, the Court
viewed the Amendment's text as only a partial exemplification of
a broader law left inexplicably unwritten.
1. Hans v. Louisiana-In Chisolm, there was no intimation
that a federal question was involved; jurisdiction was grounded
solely on diversity of citizenship.13° Thus, the Eleventh Amend-
ment was written to modify only that one of the several bases of
federal jurisdiction found in Article III of the Constitution. One
might have argued, however, that Georgia's refusal to honor its
obligations was an unconstitutional impairment of contract.
13 1
Were that the argument, a citizen of a state could sue his own state
for failure to pay debts in federal court under what is loosely
130. See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419 (1793), discussed supra section IV.A.
131. See the discussion infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text concerning this
expansive reading of the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
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described as federal question jurisdiction. Again, the federal courts
would be faced with the spectre of a money judgment to be
enforced against a state. Exactly that situation arose in Hans v.
State of Louisiana.132 Hans expanded the Eleventh Amendment
in two ways, the first necessarily entailing the other. It held that
despite the specific language of the Amendment prohibiting only
a suit against a state by a citizen of another state or nation, it also
prohibits suits against a state by its own citizens.133 Of course,
that latter position would have been very easy to write into the text
of the Amendment. Rather than what it now says, the Amendment
could have said:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecut-
ed against one of the United States by Citizens [of the United
States] or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'
Despite the obvious variance from the text, however, the Court felt
obliged to rule as it did because of its assumption-which assump-
tion is the second and critical expansion of the Eleventh Amend-
ment-that the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits arising under
the "federal question" jurisdiction of the Courts rather than simply
amending the language of the grants of diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction found in Article III. After all, the only way a citizen
of Louisiana could try to sue Lousiana in federal court is under the
Court's federal question jurisdiction. In essence, the Court felt
compelled to create a parallel Eleventh Amendment, one reading
as suggested earlier in this paragraph, to add to the one found in
the Constitution itself.
Interestingly enough, apart from the residence of the plaintiff,
Hans arose from a story strikingly similar to that which gave rise
to Chisolm.1 5 The plaintiff held bonds that the Reconstruction
government of Louisiana issued in order to finance public improve-
ments and stimulate industrial development. 13 6 The post-Recon-
struction government of Louisiana was less friendly to public
improvements and industrial development, and strongly averse to
132. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
133. See id.
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (language in brackets replacing the original language).
135. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCrION 248 (1990)
(describing the post-Reconstruction governments of the ex-Confederate states as engaged in
"fiscal retrenchment.").
136. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
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taxation to pay the bonds. Therefore, it repudiated its bond
obligations and did not pay its debts. The state did so by adoption
of a new constitution in 1879, which specifically repudiated the
bonds.3 7 Hans sued the state in federal court, claiming that the
state's issuance of bonds was a contract with him, and its repudia-
tion of that debt was an impairment of contract, a violation of the
Contracts Clause.
138
The issue thus raised was the same political hot potato as in
Chisolm-were the federal courts going to be forced to enter
money judgments against a state for defaulting on a debt; and if so,
were the federal courts going to issue writs of execution against
that state. The Hans holding on the Eleventh Amendment thus
avoided a politically unpalatable substantive ruling on the putative
federal question it raised, whether Louisiana had unconstitutionally
"impaired its contractual obligations." That substantive question
raised the troubling specter of a private citizen forcing a sale of
state property by federal marshals.
Moreover, that political hot potato was raised in the context
of the political compromise of 1877 and its immediate legacy, a
compromise in which the election in the Electoral College of
Republican Rutherford Hayes as President was assured, despite a
loss in the popular vote, in return for measures to bring Recon-
struction to an end.'39 Before Hans, in fact, the Court already
had ruled on two other cases forcing it to take an expansive
reading of the Eleventh Amendment. In one, Louisiana v.
Jume14 ° the Court ruled that a suit against state officials to
prevent the use of tax receipts for any purpose other than paying
interest due on state bonds was really a suit against the state
because it sought to compel the state to perform its contracts.141
In another case, New Hampshire v. Louisiana,142 the Court ruled
137. See id. at 2-3.
138. See id; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
139. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION-THE COMPROMISE OF
1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1966).
140. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
141. See id. at 721-722. It is difficult to reconcile this decision with Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), discussed infra Section V.B.1., except that the later decision did not
obviously implicate the actual use of funds at a later time; it is impossible to reconcile this
decision with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which allowed prospective relief that
directs the manner in which state funds are used.
142. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
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that even though a state was bringing suit in its own name, it was
really acting as a surrogate for private investors. Therefore, that
suit too was barred. 43
The Court had only itself to blame for there even being a
substantive constitutional question for Hans to raise. There is
evidence that the Contracts Clause was a poorly drafted, indiffer-
ently considered afterthought to the Constitution, added in its last
days without much discussion, and not much discussed during
ratification.'" There is also evidence that most of the discussion
of the clause assumed it meant only interference with private
contracts. 45  In any case, whatever one thinks of the "original
understanding" of the clause, the early Court gave it an extremely
broad reading in the first century of the Constitution's life.
146
That broad reading of a poorly written clause 147 necessarily was
curtailed in the Constitution's second century. 48  Had the Court
not created its own Contract Clause problems it would not have
needed to invent a "parallel" Eleventh Amendment to avoid
dealing with those problems.
The Court created its parallel Eleventh Amendment because
otherwise
we should have this anomalous result, that, in cases arising
under the constitution or laws of the United States, a state may
be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens, though it
cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other
States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the federal
courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in its own
courts.
149
143. See id. at 91.
144. See LEVY, supra note 32, at 125-28.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 130.
147. That the clause is poorly written is evidenced by the absurd result of taking it too
"literally." For example, assume that while cocaine was still a legal substance, X agreed to
sell to Y five pounds of cocaine for a set price, delivery and payment due in ten years.
Would not the outlawing of cocaine in the intervening years be an impairment of that
contract?
148. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (seminal decision
restricting the Contract Clause's applicability as far as private contracts are concerned); see
also El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (the Court allowed Texas to reduce the rights
of purchasers of state land who defaulted on their interest payments).
149. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
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That result is anomalous only if the Amendment's language is read
acontextually. That is, if it is not seen as an amendment to the
grant of diversity jurisdiction but read in the broader sense
abstracted from the remainder of the Constitution. Again, as
discussed above, if the Amendment is read in context with Article
III, it is reasonable at least to say that both readings are plausible;
and that a reading that limits the Amendment to a change of
diversity jurisdiction avoids the Hobson's choice of producing an
"anomalous result" or rewriting the Amendment altogether.
Of course, the reason the Court chose the "acontextual"
reading of the text was not based on the words' ."plain meaning" or
the like. It chose the broader meaning because it supposed that
states would never have ratified a Constitution that would allow a
state to be sued by private citizens; it felt that would be "almost an
absurdity on its face."' 50 That position of course is not based on
historical analysis, but is of the kind all too familiar in law, an
indirect way of saying that the Court found that proposition absurd.
It is not obvious that the generation that wrote the Constitution, or
ratified it, or even that wrote and ratified an amendment in
reaction to Chisolm v. Georgia, would have found it absurd on its
face; it is far from obvious that, say, the Reconstruction era
Congress and ratifiers of the Reconstruction amendments would
have found it absurd on its face; and more to the point, outside the
esoteric air of constitutional scholars, it is not likely that the typical
American citizen of today finds that proposition absurd at all.
2. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi-Several decades
after Hans, the Court expanded the "parallel" amendment still
further in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi.'1  After that
decision, the "parallel" amendment, were it to be written out,
would read:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecut-
ed against one of the United States by Citizens of [THE UNITED
STATES, BY ANY FOREIGN STATE], or by the Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.1 52
150. Id. at 15.
151. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The language in brackets includes all the new language
replacing the actual language of the textual amendment. The bracketed language in small
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Again, the creation of the new immunities for the state was not
justified by what the text said, but what the justices were sure it
meant to say. The Court did not simply read the text broadly.
Instead, it postulated what motivated the text, and ruled in a way
to serve that motivation totally unconcerned with what the text
actually prohibited.
Once again, the Amendment expanded to protect states that
would or could not pay their debts. In 1933, certain persons gave
the Principality of Monaco century-old bonds that the State of
Mississippi had issued decades before the Civil War, and on which
the State defaulted in the 1860s.'53 The purpose of the gift was
to put the bonds in the hands of some entity that might be allowed
to sue the State, since the Eleventh Amendment barred the donors.
The Principality then asked leave to bring suit in federal court, as
a suit "between a State,. . . and foreign States ..... "1"
The Court found that it had only one question to address:
the question whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a
suit brought by a foreign State against a State without her
consent. That question, not hitherto determined, is now
definitely presented.'55
That issue was not resolved by the Eleventh Amendment. The
Court explained that
[m]anifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of
the words of § 2 of Article 3, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the constitu-
tional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There
is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplat-
ed, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also
the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes
of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their
consent, save where there has been "a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention.'
156
and large capitals sets forth the new additions after the Principality of Monaco decision.
153. See Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 317. The great turmoil and dislocation
resulting from the Civil War is an obvious possible explanation for the default.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 320.
156. Id. at 322 (quoting the FEDERALIST, No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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Rather than looking to what the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution meant,
The question is whether the plan of the Constitution involves
the surrender of immunity when the suit is brought against a
State, without her consent, by a foreign State.157
That is, the plan of the Constitution at the time of its adoption and
ratification by those states who were surrendering their immunity.
While that plan did presuppose surrender of immunity to the extent
that states could sue each other (one of rare kinds of cases over
which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction),'58 the Princi-
pality of Monaco Court held that the states have not surrendered
their sovereign immunity against foreign states that are no part of
the "constitutional plan." Therefore, a State is not subject "to suits
against a state by a foreign State."'59
Interestingly, the expansion of Principality of Monaco was not
against an entirely clean slate. One hundred years earlier, in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia1" the Court appeared to premise its
Eleventh Amendment analysis on the assumption that a foreign
state could sue a state in federal court. In Cherokee Nation, the
Cherokee national government sought to enjoin the state of
Georgia from applying its laws to the Nation, as those laws were an
explicit attempt to "annihilate the Cherokees as a political society
and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation
.... ,161 In doing so, the state ignored more than one treaty
between the Cherokee Nation and the United States. While full of
sympathy for the Cherokees, Chief Justice Marshall held that
Article III did not allow the suit:
The court has bestowed its best attention on this question,
and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion that
an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a
foreign State in the sense of the constitution, and cannot
maintain an action in the courts of the United States.162
157. Id. at 323.
158. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases ... in which a State shall be a
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
159. See Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330.
160. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
161. Id. at 15.
162. Id. at 20.
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In other words, Chief Justice Marshall apparently assumed that a
"foreign State" could sue a state in federal court. After all, Article
III allows suits "between a State... and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects"-in what was set off as [9] in the list of bases of
jurisdiction in the discussion of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1
above.163 The Eleventh Amendment deleted the last three words
from the text, but the rest remained. Thus, at least in Cherokee
Nation, Marshall read the Eleventh Amendment contextually, as
editing the text of Article III.
Unfortunately for the tribes, however, according to Chief
Justice Marshall they did not come under that or any other basis of
jurisdiction found in the text. On the other hand, a foreign
power-Monaco, for instance-seems to have still be an acceptable
federal plaintiff for a Court much closer to the sentiments of the
day where the Eleventh Amendment was written than was the
Principality of Monaco Court.
Principality of Monaco suggests that if a search for underlying
principles is needed to explain the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and if these principles are allowed to alter the terms of that
text, that principle need not be couched in grand abstractions like
"sovereignty" or "sovereign immunity." Should the Court feel
tempted to reach past the Amendment's text to the principles it
"exemplifies," the principle of avoiding federal execution on state
property would do admirably well. The line of cases from Chisolm,
the decision that prompted the Eleventh Amendment,1 " to Hans,
the first expansion of that Amendment's immunity,165 to Princi-
pality of Monaco, the last great expansion of that immunity"
before the contemporary period of Blatchford,167 Seminole
Tribe,"68 and Couer d'Alene,69 suggests a simple principle to go
with the specific text. That principle holds that it is inappropriate
and unseemly to use federal judicial power directly against state
treasuries. A federal money judgment implies federal execution.
Federal execution raises the specter of something like a United
163. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
164. 2 U.S. 419 (1973).
165. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
166. 292 U.S. 313 (1931).
167. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
168. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
169. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
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States Marshal's sale of state property at public auction, or
attachment of state bank accounts.
Under the contextual reading, the concern about executing a
judgment against the state would largely disappear. The judgment
the plaintiff sought in Chisolm v. Georgia was under common law
breach of contract with common law damages. By and large there
are no "breach of Constitution" damages-if the Constitution is
used not only as a shield, as say in a criminal action against a
citizen, but by that citizen herself as a sword, the relief crafted
normally would be equitable. Moreover, if Congress were aware
federal question claims could be brought against states, Congress
would subject states to damages claims only when that result
seemed to outweigh the interests of protecting state treasuries from
judgments.
B. Counterbalancing the Expansion
In response to the massive growth in the Eleventh Amend-
ment's scope, especially in its expansion into federal question
jurisdiction, certain ameliorative doctrines had to be developed in
order to preserve federal judicial power. Although conceptually
awkward and at times cumbersome in application, these amelio-
rative doctrines by and large remedied most of the damage that
arose out of the "parallel Eleventh Amendment"-or at least,
remedied most of the damage until the contemporary expansion of
the Eleventh Amendment began with the decisions relating to
states and the First Nations, described below.17 On the one
hand, it may appear that the doctrine of state immunity threatens
to topple the Supremacy Clause and all that it implies. On the
other hand, after Hans introduced the parallel Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Court was forced to be more creative to preserve some
scope for federal jurisdiction in cases where states defy the
Supremacy Clause. In fact, the ameliorative doctrine that has had
the most effect, the doctrine created in Ex parte Young, 7' has
been explicitly called a "fiction" by the Court in recent years.
72
Neither that fiction, however, nor the less fictitious but conceptual-
ly more cumbersome abrogation doctrine, would have been needed
170. See infra Section VI.
171. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
172. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984); Couer
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 207.
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but for the Court's adoption of the acontextual reading of the
Eleventh Amendment, and the parallel Eleventh Amendment that
flowed from the seeming irrationality of the acontextual reading.
1. Ex parte Young-The Court created the oldest and most
well-established limitation on the Court's potentially boundless
doctrine of state sovereign immunity in Ex parte Young.173 The
doctrine enunciated there is most often referred to just that
way-as the Ex parte Young doctrine. That is, it is described by
the decision where it arose rather than for what it held (as opposed
to, say, the "abrogation" doctrine described below). The reason,
of course, is that it is very difficult to describe exactly what the
doctrine actually is, especially after the Court's rulings in recent
years. Ex parte Young has been described as "the culmination of
efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers
secured elsewhere in the Constitution." '174 As at least one side of
that balancing equation is the ever elusive principles "exemplif-
[ied]" 175 by the Eleventh Amendment rather than the specific
limitations of the Eleventh Amendment itself, it is no wonder that
"decisions of this Court have not been entirely consistent on this
1 176issue ....
One way to describe the doctrine might be that it allows
federal courts, despite the Eleventh Amendment, to issue injunc-
tions against state officers in their official capacities-or at least
sometimes federal courts may do so. The courts may do so by way
of a fiction that holds that a state officer, when violating federal
law (constitutional or statutory) must be doing so ultra vires, and
thus the injunction is not really against the state. 177 The Court
has recognized that this is a fiction.178 After all, even when a
state official is the nominal defendant, any judgment can operate
directly against the state itself, and injunctive relief can severely
burden a state as well. 179  Yet without this fiction the Eleventh
173. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
174. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
175. See Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 208.
176. Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 101.
177. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163.
178. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 114 n.25 ("We have noted that the
authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction that has been narrowly construed.").
179. See id. at 101 (citing Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)).
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Amendment might have swallowed the Supremacy Clause nearly
whole. On the other hand, the Ex parte Young doctrine would not
have been needed but for the development of the "parallel"
Eleventh Amendment, arising from the acontextual reading of the
Eleventh Amendment.
The original decision from which the doctrine received its
name arose because the state legislature of Minnesota, in 1906 and
1907, set maximum railroad rates and required railroad companies
to publish those rates. Before the effective date for these statutes,
the shareholders of the affected railroads brought suit in federal
court against their corporations to enjoin them from obeying the
statute, and also sued the Attorney General of the Minnesota,
Edward T. Young, to enjoin him from enforcing the state laws.
1 80
These shareholders alleged that the rates were violations of due
process. Young refused to appear and he was cited for con-
tempt.1 81 In turn, Attorney General Young filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court.182 The decision was
lengthy and convoluted, but its result was that the petition was
dismissed, the order of contempt stood, and the "authority-stripping
fiction" of Ex parte Young began.183 As later clarified in Edel-
man v. Jordan,"8 the doctrine applies only to prospective relief,
not retroactive relief-for although the action is putatively against
a "rogue" state officer acting out of bounds of authority he might
have from the state, the Court realized a money judgment would
in fact be against the state treasury. The balance of competing
interests represented by Ex parte Young partially ameliorates the
acontextual reading of the Eleventh Amendment, because it allows
some outlet for what the contextual reading allows anyway, the use
of the federal courts to resolve claims that the states are acting
unconstitutionally or in violation of federal law.
Although the doctrine arose in order to strike that elusive
balance between the Eleventh Amendment and the rest of the
Constitution and "reconcile competing interests" '85 it also has
been limited because "the need to promote the supremacy of
federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity
180. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 129.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 126-142.
183. See Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 114 n.25.
184. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
185. Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 106.
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of the states." '186 For instance, if a federal suit under Ex parte
Young were really a suit to enjoin a state officer acting ultra vires,
then there would be no reason not to enjoin that officer's acts not
only for violating federal law but also state law, if the latter claim
were brought before the federal court's pendent jurisdiction (or if
the suit were brought entirely under state law by a citizen of
another state). The Court, however, recognizing that the doctrine
rests of fiction, and viewing it as really simply a balancing of
competing interests, has noted this need "is wholly absent, however,
when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state
law."1" In other words, there is no question of asserting the
supremacy of federal law, so no interest that competes with the
state's immunity.
As will be discussed at length below,188 the balancing test
implicit in Ex parte Young has in contemporary Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence become explicit. As is always the risk in such
balancing tests, it has become an unpredictable and unreliable
guide to legal behavior, and allows the predilections of individual
judges free reign. The predilections of the current Court is to place
exceptional value in the "dignity" of states as exemplified in
immunity from suit, and thus the trend of the current Court is to
reduce the scope of Ex parte Young. Therefore, the "parallel"
Eleventh Amendment continues to expand, while the checks on its
growth shrink.
2. The Abrogation Doctrine-While Ex parte Young is the
oldest of the ameliorative doctrines under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Court more recently developed another, less fictive
limitation on the Amendment's scope, that being the "abrogation
doctrine." Under that doctrine, Congress is sometimes able to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when Congress is doing so
in service of a Constitutional grant of authority. Read broadly
enough, the direction where that doctrine once appeared to be
headed, and the acontextual reading of the Eleventh Amendment
would have died a quiet death. However, that heady moment has
passed.
186. Id. at 105.
187. Id. at 106.
188. See infra Section VI.C.
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The doctrine began, and if it still exists is now limited to, Con-
gressional action under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer189 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by then Associate Justice Rehnquist, held that "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which
it embodies, [citation omitted] are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
1 90
Therefore, the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 properly authorized federal courts to award money
damages against a state government found to have subjected an
individual to employment discrimination.1'1
That holding, even under the broadest reading of the Eleventh
Amendment and of state sovereign immunity, seems unassailable.
After all, the Fourteenth Amendment post-dates the Eleventh, and
"by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy,
[the Fourteenth Amendment] had fundamentally altered the
balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution.""
Despite the possible implications of Fitzpatrick, its holding has in
fact not opened a great breach in the dam of state sovereign
immunity. For instance, the Court has read the language of Section
1983 of Title 42, which provides for actions against "persons acting
under color of state law," to not apply to actions against states
themselves or against state officials when acting in their official
capacity.193  Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, the
primary vehicle of enforcing individual's rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment has been read not to arise under the abrogation
doctrine.
A few years later, however, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the
abrogation doctrine took a bold step into new areas. The Court
held that it came to apply not just when Congress was using power
granted it to enforce provisions of the Constitution that came after
the Eleventh Amendment but also those which existed at the time
the Eleventh Amendment was written and ratified.1 94 Union Gas
represents the high mark of the Court's attempts to rein in its
189. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
190. Id. at 456.
191. See id.
192. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (describing the holding
of Fiztpatrick).
193. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
194. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Unfortunately, it did so not
by an explicit return to the text of the Amendment but by adding
still further fictions and inexplicable exceptions onto the already
excessively complex jurisprudence surrounding that largely ignored
text. Only the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens exposed that
jurisprudence to some fresh air and light, and made an honest and
accurate assessment of what actually had been taking place over
the last ninety odd years.'95
Union Gas arose under CERCLA'96 (Superfund). Union
Gas's predecessors operated a coal gasification plant along a creek
in Pennsylvania, which produced coal tar as a by-product. 97 The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania acquired easements in the property
along the creek in order to excavate to control flooding. 98 While
excavating, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar
that began to seep into the creek.' 99 The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency found the tar to be a hazardous substance, declared
the creek a Superfund site, and together the Federal and State
governments cleaned up the site.2"0 The Federal Government
reimbursed the State for its costs, and then sought recoupment
from Union Gas.20'
At this point, the case took an interesting turn. Union Gas
brought the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania back into the suit even
though it had just paid money to clean up the creek and been
reimbursed by the United States.20 2 In other words, the United
States chose not to hold Pennsylvania financially responsible for the
cleanup, but Union Gas's third party complaint claimed that
Pennsylvania was an "owner and operator" which should be
responsible for cleanup costs under CERCLA.2 °3 Pennsylvania
pleaded the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the suit;2 and
after all, why should Union Gas be able to sue a state when the
United States (the one party in all of creation not (yet) held to be
195. See id. at 23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 (1994).
197. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 6.
201. See id.
202. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.





barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing a state) quite
clearly chose not to?
In any case, the district court dismissed the third party
complaint because of the Eleventh Amendment; the Court of
Appeals affirmed; but the Supreme Court, in a set of confusing
opinions, reversed.2"5 The Court's essential holding was that
Congress intended to make states liable in money damages under
CERCLA,2 6 thus abrogating the states's sovereign immunity, and
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to do
so. 20 7 As Justice Brennan explained,
it must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the
authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their
immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this
authority, to render them liable.2'
Read out of the convoluted context of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, Justice Brennan's statement was nothing but simple
common sense, although it drew the ire of Justice Scalia in his
opinion. Both opinions relied heavily on the same source of
authority-precedent-but drew distinctly different conclusions
about the "principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.
'" 20 9
Justice Scalia could not accept limitation of that principle-presum-
ably, state sovereign immunity-"through appeal to antecedent
provisions of the Constitution," reasoning that the Amendment
came after these provisions, and thus modified them. x° On the
other hand, Justice Brennan argued that if the principle of
sovereign immunity [which the Amendment only "exemplifies"]
preexisted the Constitution, then states agreed in the plan of the
convention to give up that immunity in certain circumstances.
211
205. See id. Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion while Justice Stevens filed a
concurring opinion. See id. at 5, 23. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in
part. See id. at 45. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in part. See
id. at 29. Finally, Justice O'Connor filed her own dissenting opinion. See id. at 57.
206. See id. at 13, 20.
207. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 20.
208. Id. at 19-20.
209. Compare id. at 17-18 with id. at 41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 41.
211. See id. at 18.
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These circumstances would include the grant of power to the
212federal government over such things as interstate commerce.
Only Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion noticed the key
flaw in both sets of arguments. Pennsylvania was claiming
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that
Amendment is not an enunciation of principle, either a reaffirma-
tion or creation of state sovereign immunity.213 He pointed out
in his opinion,
[s]everal of this Court's decisions make clear that much of our
state immunity doctrine has absolutely nothing to do with the
limit on judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amend-
ment.214
Unfortunately, neither the lead opinion nor any of the other
opinions were willing to accept the simple truth of Justice Stevens'
observation. Justice Brennan's opinion accepted the conclusion
that the Eleventh Amendment "reflect[s] the principle of sovereign
immunity" and further accepted it was this reflected principle that
mattered, not the concrete language of the Amendment.215
Therefore, to reach its conclusion it had to add a new fiction to the
rather significant store of fictions available to avoid the evident fact
that the Eleventh Amendment was read entirely too broadly in
Hans.
Although the ruling in Union Gas only made Eleventh
Amendment doctrine more complicated, it could have been a
precursor to something much more monumental-the eventual
abandonment of the acontextual reading of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and the attendant emphasis on the implied general principle
of sovereign immunity that gave rise to the parallel Eleventh
Amendment. One might have expected the complicated fictions to
chip away at the overbroad prohibitions from cases like Hans and
Principality of Monaco, until the entire edifice collapsed. In fact,
just eleven years ago, one commentator said that "four of [the
Court's] members, and possibly a fifth, may now be prepared to
212. See Union Gas. 491 U.S. at 18.
213. See id. at 24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 25.
215. See id. at 7.
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consider wholesale changes to the immunity doctrine that has
survived, more or less intact, for the last hundred years.,
216
In the intervening years, however, the change that has come
has not been to abandon the parallel Eleventh Amendment but to
expand it still further. The vehicle for the expansion largely has
been a set of cases concerning suits by First Nations against states
on matters that one might anticipate belong paradigmatically in a
federal court-matters of how two governments, both with some
retained sovereignty but both part of our federal system, interact.
The Court has held, however, that the First Nations cannot adjust
their differences with states in the federal courts, even when there
is a clear federal mandate that they do so.
VI. Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment Today
Imagine a Constitution establishing a union between formerly
sovereign states in which no provision was made for the courts of
that union to resolve border disputes between constituent
states-no union or federal tribunal of any sort. Alternatively,
imagine that one of the states was not formerly sovereign, but
entirely the creation of the union as a whole, including the
establishment of its borders. Meanwhile, the other state, although
it was formerly completely sovereign, had been long viewed as
having surrendered up to the union the establishment and keeping
of its boundaries. Finally, imagine even in this last instance, when
both "sovereigns" have boundaries that are creations of the union
or "federal government," the federal tribunals are not allowed to
hear and settle the border disputes as presented by the two sides
themselves. That may seem a ridiculous way to run a superpower,
but after the Court's decision in Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, it is not necessary to imagine such a thing, because the
Court has held the Eleventh Amendment prohibits resolution of
such border disputes.217 That decision is one of several in recent
216. Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 212, 212 (1988).
217. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
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years that address the relationship between the First Nations218
and the Eleventh Amendment.
In the past few terms, the Supreme Court issued a trilogy of
decisions in which the Court denied the First Nations the opportu-
nity to resolve disputes with the states surrounding them. 19 In
each of these decisions, the Court relied on the Eleventh Amen-
dment to find that the federal courts are not available where they
are most needed-in a dispute between two sovereign entities
located within the geographic and political borders of the United
States. The most recent decision, the aforementioned Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, is so deferential to the states'
sovereignty that it deprives the First Nations of the first and most
basic attribute of their sovereignty, that being the right to assert
power over a defined and bounded territory.22°
These cases illustrate a feature peculiar to federal "Indian
law", the fact that the abstract principles expressed in generalities
by the Court sound very respectful of tribal power and rights but
applied look very bad for that power and those rights. The more
respectful the Court sounds of the First Nations the more likely it
seems they will lose the actual case being decided.2 ' This special
Indian law paradox, however, could not have the effect it has in
cases in which the State raises the Eleventh Amendment as a
defense but for the Court's ungrounded Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. Moreover, the Court's First Nation jurisprudence
affects the rest of the Eleventh Amendment as well. Two of the
most significant "ameliorative" doctrines the Court developed to fill
218. "First Nations" is the term used in this Article to apply to the indigenous communi-
ties of the United States, especially in their political capacity, a capacity recognized in federal
law as a "federally recognized Indian tribe." For further discussion of this terminology, see
John Randolph Prince III, Indian Country: A Different Model of Sovereignty, 33 GONz. L.
REv. 103, 104 n.4 (1998).
219. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261.
220. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261; see also Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 274
(1808) (noting that every nation possesses exclusive dominion within its own territory.
221. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988) (where the Supreme Court's opinion concerning whether tribes could obtain an
injunction against logging activities on public land when the tribe claimed such logging
violated the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978,42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994), began
with the recognition that such logging
could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices ... too
much disturbance of the area's natural state would clearly render any meaningful
continuation of traditional practices impossible.
Despite that language, the tribe lost. See id.
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the "remedial gaps" of its excessively deferential Eleventh
Amendment rulings are, of course, Ex parte Young and the
abrogation doctrine enunciated in Union Gas. The latter doctrine
was completely destroyed in Seminole Tribe and the former
significantly damaged in Coeur d'Alene Tribe.
A. Blatchford-The Final Expansion
The first of the three decisions that have, in effect, destroyed
a tribe's power as sovereign to act as sovereign in opposition to a
state asserting its sovereignty was Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak,222 a 1991 decision Justice Scalia wrote, from which
Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens dissented. 23  The
Blatchford opinion is notable for Justice Scalia's decision to
maintain the result of one of the most famous decisions of the
Marshall Court in the first half of nineteenth century, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,224 by standing the rationale of the latter
decision on its head. In the process, it stands the Eleventh
Amendment on its head as well. The Blatchford Court did not
base its analysis on what sorts of cases the Amendment excludes
from federal jurisdiction. Rather, it speculated about what kind of
suit against a state, if any, could be brought in federal court based
on the Court's own view of the nontextual principles that allegedly
existed in some unspecified Platonic reality even before the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.225
In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the
tribes could not sue because they were "not a foreign state in the
sense of the Constitution. ' '226 Therefore, in 1831 the Court held
that the First Nations are not independent sovereigns like foreign
nations-which it implied could maintain an action in the courts of
the United States-and therefore could not sue a state. One
hundred years later, the Court decided that foreign nations could
222. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
223. Of course, there have been numerous decisions in recent years that have reduced
the areas in which tribal sovereignty is even recognized to exist. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1
Contractors. 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that a tribal court has no power to hear an
automobile accident case arising on reservation, on road surrounded by tribally held land,
simply because the roadbed itself is on a right of way granted to the state to put a highway
through the reservation).
224. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
225. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775.




not sue a state either, in Principality of Monaco v. Monaco.227
Therefore, one hundred and sixty years after Cherokee Nation, the
Court held that the First Nations are just like foreign nations-and
therefore could not sue a state. In 1831, the Court made sure to
find limits on the sovereignty of the First Nations, to keep them
under control. In 1991, what little sovereignty the First Nations
were recognized to have was turned against them.2'
In Blatchford, certain Alaska Native villages filed suit against
the State of Alaska's Commissioner of Community and Regional
Affairs challenging the implementation of State revenue-sharing
statute.229 Justice Scalia immediately turned to the Eleventh
Amendment, and noted that at least since the time of Han v.
Louisiana, the Court has
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional
structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal
system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority
in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a State will
therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has
consented to suit, either expressly or in the 'plan of the
[Constitutional] convention. 23°
Justice Scalia then explained why the First Nations, although
sovereigns themselves, from suing other sovereigns within the
federal system, the states, even though it is clear states can and do
sue each other. As he analyzed affairs,
What makes the States' surrender immunity from suit by sister
States is the mutuality of that concession. There is no such
mutuality with either foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes. We
have repeatedly held that Indian tribes enjoy immunity against
suits by States."3
227. 292 U.S. 313 (1934); see the discussion of supra notes 151-168 and accompanying
text.
228. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address an important question that Cherokee
Nation left, and Blatchford confused: forgetting about the misapplied Eleventh Amendment,
what is the Article III jurisdictional grant that allows tribes to be in federal court at all?
While that issue is not one for this Article, the short answer starts with the words "federal
question."
229. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 778.
230. Id. at 779. Note Justice Scalia's explicit rejection of the text of the Constitution as
controlling constitutional interpretation.
231. Id. at 782.
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This "mutuality of concession" shows that the states' ability to sue
each other is part of the Constitutional plan. Superficially, the
argument makes some sense. Looking beyond the superficial,
however, it is clear that the so-called mutuality of state and tribal
sovereignty-that states and tribe, mutually, cannot sue each other
-is a myth. The Tribe's immunity can be abrogated in its entirety;
it exists entirely at the sufferance of Congress. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained in an opinion issued in the same term as
Blatchford, "Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with
such tribal immunity or to limit it." '232 Moreover, he made that
statement in a case in which the Court held that the state of
Oklahoma could not collect sales tax from the tribe on cigarettes
sold on tribal land by tribal enterprises. 3 At the same time, the
Court held that the tax, as one on the buyers of cigarettes, was due
and owing, and the tribe did have a duty to collect those taxes-but
sovereign immunity made a suit to enforce that duty impossi-
ble.2" The state was free to seek to collect the tax through other
means, such as directly from the buyers; and of course, Congress
could at any time choose to demolish the tribe's sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, the second of the two cases in the
trilogy, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida5 makes it clear that
Congress cannot get rid of state sovereign immunity, even when it
forces the tribe to do so in the same statutory scheme.
B. Seminole Tribe-The End of Abrogation
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida addressed the power of
the sovereign tribe to bring an action against a state in a situation
where Congress specifically intended to abrogate the state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity.236 The Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act ("IGRA") 237 imposes upon the states a duty to negotiate
in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a
232. Citizen Band of Pottawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991) (emphasis added). Interestingly, Citizen Band was decided the same
term as Blatchford-the former making it clear that the tribal sovereignty was a mere gift
of Congress, while the latter decision relies on that oft-abrogated gift to deny a "mutuality
of concession" between tribe and state.
233. See id. at 514.
234. See id. at 512-513.
235. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
236. See id.
237. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
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compact regulating gambling in Indian country found within the
boundaries of a state,238 and authorizes a tribe to bring suit in
federal court against a state in order to compel performance of that
duty.2 39 Pursuant to IGRA, the Seminole Tribe of Indians filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida against Florida and its officers to compel negotiations after
the State of Florida refused to negotiate such a compact. 24° The
State of Florida raised a defense of sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 4' Ultimately, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court agreed with the State that
despite Congress's express intent in IGRA to abrogate the State's
sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment forbade any such
suit.
2 42
Of course, the requirement that a First Nation consult another
political entity before deciding what economic activities to allow
within the Nation's territory is in itself a major surrender of
sovereignty. The IGRA was a compromise of both the State's
''sovereign immunity" and an attribute of sovereignty claimed by
states themselves and many tribes as well-the right to make their
own decisions about gambling on their territory.24 3  Thus, if
broader principles of sovereignty suggest the state cannot be sued,
then those same principles might suggest the tribes can and should
ignore the states surrounding them, and refuse to negotiate
gambling compacts themselves. On the other hand, if suits between
sovereigns depend on mutual concession, there is plenty of such
concession to go around in state-tribal relations 2"
The state's immunity is constitutional; after Seminole Tribe, it
is clear that Congress cannot abrogate that immunity except,
perhaps, to enforce the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments,
while the tribe's exists entirely at Congress's sufferance. The
IGRA certainly limited tribal sovereign immunity, for if the tribe
violates a gaming contract with Florida the state could subject the
238. See id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
239. See id. § 2710(d)(7).
240. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F.Supp. 655 (D.C. Fla. 1992).
241. See id.
242. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
243. See, e.g., DEAN R. SNOW, THE IROQUOIS 201-209 (1994) (discussing pro-gambling
factions at the Mohawk reservation at Akwesasne/St. Regis claiming unrestricted rights to
engage in gaming irrespective of the positions of the State of New York or the federal
government).
244. See the discussion at supra notes 232-239 and accompanying text.
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tribe to civil fines and closure of the tribes's gaming facilities,245
and in fact could seek to have the tribe's patrons and employees
criminally prosecuted in federal court.246 Indeed, Congress not
only can strip the tribes of their immunity but their very sovereign-
ty in all its aspects.2"7 The result is that, after Seminole Tribe, the
State can refuse to do what Congress presumably has the power to
order it to do under the Indian Commerce Clause and immune
from suit to coerce it to do what it is supposed to do. The effect
is that the State's exercise of sovereignty will prohibit the Tribe's
own exercise of its sovereignty-the Tribe will not be able to make
its own decisions about gaming.
For the Eleventh Amendment, however, Seminole Tribe has
even broader implications than that the First Nations are in a
disfavored position in our complex coordinate system of affiliated
governments. To reach its result, the Court not only held that the
Indian Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, but the Commerce Clause did
not either, explicitly and bluntly overruling Union Gas.248 In so
doing, the Court explained that the entire doctrine of abrogation
rested on two cases-the now defunct Union Gas and Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer which held the Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment.249 As noted above, the power of the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity has been found
sparingly, to say the least, as can be seen from the fact that the
only time the Court has found it is in the Fitzpatrick decision itself.
It remains a possible source of restored federal jurisdiction, but
largely an untapped source.25°
The Seminole Tribe Court not only overruled Union Gas and
dealt a severe blow to abrogation, but it also began a process of
245. See 25 U.S.C. § 2713 (1994).
246. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(b) (1994).
247. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain
their existing sovereign powers.").
248. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). ("We feel bound
to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is,
overruled.").
249. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also the discussion at supra notes 189-193 and accompanying
text.
250. But see College Sav. Bank v. Florida Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 148 F.3d
1343 (3d 1998), infra Section VII.A.2.
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weakening the doctrine of Ex parte Young, a process that continued
into its next term and its latest attack on the First Nations, Idaho
v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho. One must bear in mind that the
Seminole Tribe was not seeking money damages obtained from the
state treasury. It sought to compel the state to enter mediation
about a compact as required by IGRA. That remedy, although a
creature of a statute, was of course equitable in nature. In order
to hedge its bets, moreover, the Seminole Tribe brought suit
against the Governor individually to compel him to act in accor-
dance with federal law-in other words, a suit under Ex parte
Young. The nature of the remedy sought was totally prospective
and totally equitable in nature. Despite the apparently clear claim
under Ex parte Young, however, the Court found the suit against
the Governor to be barred as well.5
The Court's explanation for why a suit for prospective, non-
monetary relief against a state officer still was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment was that the suit would improperly supple-
ment a statutory remedial scheme with one created by the judiciary.
"[Wihere Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for
the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a
court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte
Young." 2  The detailed remedial scheme to which the Court
referred included an order directing the state and the Indian tribe
to conclude a compact within sixty days.53 If the parties disre-
gard the court's order and failed to conclude a compact within the
sixty-day period, the only sanction is that each party then must
submit a proposed compact to a mediator. 54 Finally, if the state
fails to accept the compact selected by the mediator, that mediator
shall notify the Secretary of the Interior, who then must prescribe
regulations governing Class III gaming on the tribal lands at
issue." All the Seminole Tribe was seeking in the litigation
before the Court was the first step in that process-an order to
conclude a compact in sixty days, directed at the state official who
251. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-76.
252. Id. at 74.
253. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(1994).
254. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(iv).
255. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(vii). Given that the State has shortcircuited the first two steps
of this remedial process, one might speculate what would happen if the Seminole Tribe had
applied directly to the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe gaming regulations.
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was responsible for the non-compliance with IGRA's commands.
Yet the Court concluded that such an order would be "additional"
to the statute's own remedies, because the statute is directed at
"the State" and not particular state officers! 6 If only Congress
had said, instead of "order the State," the words "order an
appropriate State official" the Seminole Tribe might have succeed-
ed in its suit.7 Or, perhaps, had Congress simply not included
a remedial scheme at all, the tribe could have obtained an order
against the governor under Ex parte Young. The problem with the
tribe's suit, therefore, was that it not only could prove a state
officer was violating federal law, but it could show that Congress
intended state officers to follow federal law, and that Congress
wanted to provide a means for that to happen. Apparently, Ex
parte Young only allows injunctive relief for violation of vague
federal laws.
The absurdity of the Court's reasoning in Seminole Tribe
suggests that its real objection to a lawsuit by a tribe seeking to
compel a state to deal with it as a coordinate government is
something other than what it says. In the next term the Court's
decision in Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho258 confirmed
that suspicion. After that decision, the Court has made it clear that
it cannot conceive of a tribe dealing with a state as a coordinate
government, dealing a bad blow to tribal sovereignty." Howev-
er, the Court also showed its increasing commitment to state
sovereign immunity, and its increased antipathy even to injunctive
relief against state action.
The result of Seminole Tribe is that the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment has expanded drastically, but the ways available to
counterbalance that expansion are disappearing. Only a year after
Seminole Tribe did away with most of the abrogation doctrine and
cast a shadow over the doctrine of Ex parte Young, the Court in
Couer d'Alene Tribe hinted at the further dissolution of Ex parte
Young. Instead, the Court may turn to the sort of balancing test
that turns all attempts to hold states accountable to federal law into
a gamble. Each new case will require plaintiffs to dedicate
256. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17.
257. See id.
258. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
259. See Prince, supra note 218.
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resources to litigation that the federal court may find "on balance"
should not be brought.
C Couer d'Alene-Ex parte Young Becomes a Balancing Test
The capstone of confusion over the Eleventh Amendment and
the tribes came in Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho.26 ° First, the
Blatchford Court abandoned the text of the Eleventh Amendment
entirely, relying on the Amendment's putative "broader principles"
and the undiscovered country of the plan of the convention's
implications in order to find that sovereign tribes and sovereign
States cannot sue each other.261 Then, in Seminole Tribe, the
Court completely jettisoned its recent innovation, the abrogation
doctrine, intended to ameliorate the remedial gap its own Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence had created.262  Finally, in Couer
d'Alene, the Court reduced the ameliorative doctrine with the
longest pedigree, that enunciated in Ex parte Young, to an
unreliably confused mess.
2 63
The Couer d'Alene Tribe lives on the Columbia Plateau in
Northern Idaho, to which region they are indigenous. 64 Along
with many other related aboriginal nations of the Columbia
Plateau, they agreed under rather obvious pressure to relinquish
their sovereign status over much of the land they had lived on for
centuries and accept a diminished area reserved for them as against
the claims of the United States and its citizens.265 In 1873,
President Grant issued an Executive Order establishing the Coeur
d'Alene Reservation.266  The boundaries established by that
Executive Order included the banks and beds and submerged lands
of Lake Coeur d'Alene and some portions of various rivers and
streams, including the Spokane River, the Coeur d'Alene River,
and the Saint Joe River. 67 Seventeen years later, in 1890, the
territory of Idaho was admitted to statehood, completely surround-
260. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
261. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Naotak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
262. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
263. See Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261.
264. See id. at 264-65.
265. See id.
266. See Exec. Order of November 8, 1873, reprinted in 1 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN




ing the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. 268  The following year, in
1891, Congress formally ratified the fourteen year old agreement
with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.269
Although Lake Coeur d'Alene is within those boundaries that
were preserved to the tribe out of the larger territory to which it
held aboriginal sovereign title, and although that reservation
preceded the creation of the state of Idaho, Idaho has long
assumed and exercised sovereignty over the lake. In fact, in its
brief to the Supreme Court in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Idaho stated
that "[t]he Tribe's action threatens the sovereign authority of the
state of Idaho,, 27 0 begging the answer to the real underlying
question-which sovereign has authority in that territory-the same
way, as we shall see, the Supreme Court did. In any case, the
state's exercise of authority was not hypothetical. Idaho not only
claimed the submerged lands under the lake,271 it vested manage-
ment of the lake in a state board of land commissioners. 272 That
state board in turn took such actions as leasing part of the bed of
the lake to private operators for a marina, an action challenged in
court as destructive to the environment.273 In that challenge, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the State was in fact the owner of
the lake and had the right to act as it did.274 By contrast, that
same year the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruled that
in fact the Tribe was sovereign over a portion of the lakebed,275
and the United States has taken the position, both in the recent
Supreme Court proceeding and in ongoing litigation it has brought
as the tribe's trustee, that in fact the Tribe is sovereign over much
of the disputed territory.276  Unfortunately for the tribe, the
United States' claim is for less territory than the tribe's claim, so
268. See Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1452 n.5 (D. Idaho
1992).
269. See id. 1452 n.5.
270. Brief for the State of Idaho, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261
(1997) (No. 94-1474).
271. See IDAHO CODE § 67-4305 (Michie 1995).
272. See id. § 58-104(9) (1995).
273. See Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d
1085 (Idaho 1983).
274. See id.
275. See Determining Permanent Occupancy Right to Coeur d'Alene Bedlands and
Remanding for Development and Decision of Further Issues, 25 F.E.R.C. P61, 228 (1983).




the tribe cannot simply allow the former's lawsuit to settle the
matter.277
Given the fundamental nature of the question involved for the
tribal sovereign, that question being exactly where its borders may
lie, it could not afford to ignore the dispute, nor could it simply
acquiesce in the United States' compromise position. Whenever
there is a dispute between two sovereign entities over a border,
there are only three methods available to resolve the dispute-war,
negotiation, and litigation. The last, litigation, is only feasible when
both sovereign entities can agree that an available forum is neutral
and one to which both are bound to defer. Couer d'Alene tribe
chose litigation; after all, it is the "plan of the [Constitutional]
convention," surely, to avoid war inside the nation's borders. That
description of the "plan," by the way, is not intended as sarcastic.
At the time of the Constitutional convention, not only were the
founders aware of the various First Nations, but the real possibility
of war between those nations and one or more or the United States
was both serious and constant. Moreover, independent actions by
the various States, without the approval or participation of the
United States as a whole, had led to just such wars with the First
Nations. 278 Therefore, the Constitution granted to Congress alone
the exclusive power to deal with the First Nations.
In any case, the Couer d'Alene Tribe chose to litigate, filing
suit in federal court. This was not, theoretically, its only available
forum. The State of Idaho allows persons to brings claims against
the state, in the state's own courts, when persons claim title to
personal or real property in the state's possession.2" That cause
of action does not allow, of course, the recovery of any money
judgment.' 8  Although irrelevant to the issues raised in Couer
d'Alene, that last point is a reminder of the central unexpressed
concern underlying the Eleventh Amendment, the spectre of a
money judgment and subsequent execution procedures against a
state. To suggest that a tribe, surrounded by a state which has
expressed as a matter of majority will a desire to deprive the tribe
277. See id.
278. See, e.g., GRACE STEELE WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES 107 (1963) (describing of
the violations of the Treaty of Hopewell, a treaty between the new United States and the
Cherokee Nation, by among others the state of Georgia, and the warfare this violation
caused in and around what is now Muscle Shoals, Alabama).




of its rights in the disputed property, might choose to go to that
state's own courts-presided over by elected judges-is ludicrous,
however. Moreover, ultimately, the issues at stake are not state
issues but issues of federal law-the effect to be given to preceding
federal agreements with tribes as opposed to the rights the federal
government gives to newly created states. Indeed, the question are
issues of federal constitutional law in its deepest sense, touching on
how a nation like ours, a federal system that tries to balance
several constituent sovereign entities, can be constituted. Thus, the
Tribe's action was not simply one in which they sought to quiet
title, because in a normal suit of that nature a private citizen could
obtain title without challenging the state's underlying power to
regulate the use of the land and impose its laws on the inhabitants
thereof. However, the Tribe was claiming to be more than a
landowner, but the sovereign as well. 1
The federal action the Tribe filed attempted to cover all the
bases. First, both the Tribe and individual members filed suit. The
suit sought to quiet title over the disputed submerged lands, and it
sought a declaration that statutes purporting to regulate the lake
were invalid, especially the primary water right statute claiming the
lake.' Finally, it sought to have the court enjoin the state, its
agencies, and a number of specified state officials from taking any
action to regulate or in any way affect the lake and the Tribe's
rights over it. 3  The prayer for injunctive relief was cast in at
least one count in terms of relief under section 1983 of Title 42 to
protect the plaintiff's constitutional rights and privileges.' The
state and all its officials moved to dismiss, asserting the Eleventh
Amendment, and on the merits. 5 The district court held that all
of the complaint except those for injunctive relief against certain
state officers were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; it further
281. Although common law began to distinguish between that bundle of private rights
over land we call "title" and the underlying rights of the sovereign over that land centuries
ago, the two are virtually inseparable in federal Indian law. Tribal sovereignty, for all intents
and purposes, is coextensive with tribal title.
282. See Couer d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443,1445 (D. Idaho 1992); see also
IDAHO CODE § 67-4304 (Michie 1995). ("The governor is hereby authorized and directed
to appropriate in trust for the people of the state of Idaho all the unappropriated water
of... Coeur d'Alene Lakes").
283. See Couer d'Alene Tribe, 798 F. Supp. at 1445.
284. See id. at 1452.
285. See id. at 1445.
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found that, on the merits, Idaho had superior claim to the lake.286
In so doing, the court noted that "the ownership of land under
navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty., 287 That statement
illuminates the attitude of all the courts in the litigation. Through-
out the Couer d'Alene litigation, the discussion focused on the
state's sovereignty, and a consequent need for sovereign immunity.
None focused on the Tribe's sovereignty, and the consequent need
to have a forum to which two disputing sovereigns both purported-
ly part of the United States and both purportedly governed by the
Constitution could turn.
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court, except its
examination of the few claims the district court allowed past the
Eleventh Amendment, the claims for injunctive relief against state
officials, led the Court of Appeals to believe there was a serious
dispute over title to the submerged lands.2" The Supreme
Court's decision rendered all discussion of the merits of the Tribe's
claims irrelevant, however, because it expanded the Eleventh
Amendment to prohibit still more suits than ever before. Despite
the rule of Ex parte Young, even suits by tribal members under
Section 1983 of Title 42 seeking to enjoin state officials from
violating their rights were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court enunciated many reasons, of course, why this suit was
different from all the other section 1983 suits, but there was no
agreement on any one. The disturbing result is that at least some
suits under section 1983 against state actors, even suits not seeking
any money damages at all, are barred, and there is no way to
define the boundaries of this prohibition.
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for a highly fractured
Court.289 Only Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist
286. See id. at 1451. The gist of the court's reasoning was that the creation of a reserva-
tion is a "conveyance" to the tribe (even though the tribe had title to that land and more
before the agreement with the United States under the principles of "aboriginal title"), and
that there is a strong, nearly irrebuttable presumption against conveyance of title to sub-
merged lands under navigable waterways, which are preserved for the state, even when the
state did not exist at the time of the so-called conveyance. See id. at 1148-1150. That result
is at least arguably supported by a variety of Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. at 544, 552 (1981).
287. Id. at 1449. The Tribe, attempting to assert its sovereignty, probably would
agree.
288. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court
of Appeals found the presumption mentioned supra note 286, to be strong, but rebuttable.
See id. at 1255.
289. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
[104:1
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
agreed in all particulars with the former's opinion.29 Justice
O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring with the judgment but
disagreeing with a significant part of the reasoning in Justice
Kennedy's opinion, and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined her.291
Meanwhile, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer all joined with
Justice Souter in dissent.292 The dissent is unremarkable, defend-
ing as it were the status quo and arguing that a claim for prospec-
tive relief based on a violation of federal law is cognizable in
federal court and that this is what the Tribe sought to have
heard. 293  Both the principal and concurring opinions, however,
are in varying degrees revolutionary. The five justices who voted
to reverse the Court of Appeals all agreed that Ex parte Young
needed to be limited in some fashion to prohibit suits that
challenge state sovereignty and "State ownership of [lands
underlying navigable waters] has been 'considered an essential
attribute of sovereignty.' ,,294 Justice Kennedy and the Chief
Justice appear to want to replace Ex parte Young with a new test,
while the three others would simply impose certain ill-defined, "I
know it when I see it" limits on the Young test.
After rehearsing the oft-repeated conclusion that tribes were
not part of the plan of the convention and thus were under the bar
of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Kennedy turned to the
question of why the Tribe should not be allowed to bring an action
seeking prospective relief against state officials who were allegedly
engaged in an ongoing and blatant violation of federal law, that law
being the acts of Congress and the President establishing the
Tribe's borders before Idaho even was a state.2 95 Justice Kenne-
dy, and in this he wrote for all five justices who decided against the
Tribe and for the State, first pointed out the obvious, "that Young
rests on a fictional distinction between the official and the
State., 296 Thus, he argued against a simple application of rather
straightforward criteria in the manner of the dissent.297 Rather,
290. See id.
291. See id. at 288.
292. See id. at 297.
293. See id.
294. See Couer d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 282. (quoting Utah Div. of State Lands v. United
States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987)).
295. See id. at 269.
296. See id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).
297. See id. Justice Souter's opinion thought the Young test to be simply this:
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Kennedy argued (and in this statement four other justices agreed)
that
Application of the Young exception must reflect a proper
understanding of its role in our federal system and respect for
state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious
fiction.298
If we cannot rely on Young "reflexively," what can we do? Both
Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor's opinions, in one way or
another, fall back on that dreadful crutch of contemporary
jurisprudence, the "balancing" metaphor. But first, Justice
Kennedy suggested, if only for himself and the Chief Justice,
something much more breathtaking-an entirely new doctrine,
unfounded in any hint of text in the Eleventh Amendment or
elsewhere in the Constitution, to take the place of Ex parte Young.
Justice Kennedy first interpreted the long and confusing
history of Ex parte Young suits to rely on two sets of circumstances.
As his view of history has it
there are, in general, two instances where Young has been
applied. The first is where there is no state forum available to
vindicate federal interests, thereby placing upon Article III
courts the special obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal
statutory and constitutional law.2"
That statement is the crux of what is bold and new in Kennedy's
opinion, and possibly an opening salvo in a battle to replace Ex
Parte Young with the "Couer d'Alene" doctrine. Under that test,
the Tribe here loses for the simple, mechanical reason that a state
forum existed. Justice Kennedy spent considerable effort in the
next several pages of the opinion defending his interpretation of Ex
Parte Young. Few of the many cases decided under the Young
doctrine in which the lack of a state forum could be said to have
been a problem. Furthermore, he defended state courts as
perfectly acceptable fora for federal, even constitutional questions,
The plaintiff must allege that the officers are acting in violation of federal
law,... and must seek prospective relief to address an ongoing violation, not
compensation or other retrospective relief for violations past.
Id. at 298-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
298. See id. at 270.
299. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 270.
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even when the state itself is a party.3°° Under that test, of course,
the Couer d'Alene Tribe's suit would be barred from federal court.
Notably, Justice Kennedy's explanation that he would allow an
Ex parte Young injunctive action only when there was no adequate
state forum directly conflicts with the rationale in Hans v. Louisi-
ana, which helped the parallel Eleventh Amendment (and but for
that parallel amendment, the Ex parte Young fiction would never
have been needed in the first place). Recall that in Hans the Court
reasoned that it must bar claims by a state's own citizens because
otherwise
we should have this anomalous result, that, in cases arising
under the constitution or laws of the United States, a state may
be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens, though it
cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other
states, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the federal
courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in its own
courts.3°1
The Hans Court seemed to be disturbed by what it viewed as an
anomaly-a federal action where no state action was possible-but
Justice Kennedy considers that situation to be the best justification
for a federal suit. If nothing else, this disparity that what seemed
to be an anomaly to one Court is quite rational and fair to another.
That fact alone ought to make us suspicious of all the talk about
being required to ignore the text of the Eleventh Amendment
because of the anomalous or absurd or inequitable results to which
the text gives rise.
Justice Kennedy grudgingly had to admit that not all Ex parte
Young cases could be made to fit his "lack of a state forum" test.
There was another instance where the Young doctrine applied,
although clearly he believes that second test should be abandoned.
He is just not ready to announce its death quite yet, however, until
he has laid the groundwork sufficiently. Justice Kennedy wrote the
following about that "second instance:"
a second instance in which Young may serve an important
interest is when the case calls for the interpretation of federal
law .... [however] It is difficult to say States consented to
these types of suits in the plan of the convention. Neither in
theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to have
300. See id. at 270-80.
301. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
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federal claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity would be applicable in federal court but for an
exception based on Young. For purposes of the Supremacy
Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is brought in
state or federal court.3°
And still later:
It would be error coupled with irony were we to bypass the
Eleventh Amendment, which enacts a scheme solicitous of the
States, on the sole rationale that state courts are inadequate to
enforce and interpret federal rights in every case.3 °3
In response, one might note the irony of the Court's choosing to
bypass the Eleventh Amendment in order to enact a scheme
excessively solicitous of the States. As ought to be clear from the
language above, Justice Kennedy distrusts the second instance,
thinks it an erroneous reason to allow suits in federal court despite
state sovereign immunity, and would like to bring it to an end.
Short of being able to do that, however, he does the next best
thing; subject that instance of Young doctrine to a balancing test.
In expressing his disapproval of the notion that federal courts
are needed to vindicate federal rights and enforce federal law,
Justice Kennedy, and with him Chief Justice Rehnquist, reveal an
illuminating historical oversight in their Constitutional jurispru-
dence in just one little sentence immediately following the lengthy
passage quoted in the preceding paragraph. Justice Kennedy
wrote, "[fjederal courts, after all, did not have general federal-
question jurisdiction until 1875." 304 In 1875-the decade after the
Civil War, when a huge proportion of the population of the United
States died learning the lesson the hard way that we were not going
to sacrifice national unity to states rights and all the local evils that
can hide under the banner of states rights. Both the Reconstruc-
tion Congress and the Ex parte Young Court some thirty-three
years later knew well that federal courts must stand ready to
enforce federal law, especially against countervailing claims by
states.
In any case, like it or not, Justice Kennedy could not do away
with all the cases based on the notion that federal law requires
federal courts, and could not reduce all Ex parte Young decisions
302. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 274-75.
303. Id. at 276.
304. Id. at 275.
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to cases forced on the federal courts because no other forum
existed. Therefore, Justice Kennedy reasoned that, to allow suits
by plaintiffs seeking prospective relief from ongoing violations of
federal law because of the importance of protecting that federal law
in a federal court, there must also be a "a careful balancing and
accommodation of state interests when determining whether the
Young exception applies in a given case."3 °5 This balancing must
be done on a case by case basis. As the decision of the three
justices who actually concurred with his result characterized this
approach,
the principal opinion replaces a straightforward inquiry into
whether a complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law
and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective with a
vague balancing test that purports to account for a "broad"
range of unspecified factors.3°6
Yet all five justices who voted to reverse in fact did that very thing
-they went beyond the straightforward inquiry of whether
prospective relief was claimed. Both the principal and concurring
opinions agreed that the fact that something so significant to state
sovereignty as title to submerged lands was involved must be
weighed against the litigant's fulfillment of the normal requirements
of Ex parte Young.
Again writing for a majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that
[t]he suit seeks, in effect, a determination that the lands in
question are not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the
State. The requested injunctive relief would bar the State's
principal officers from exercising their governmental powers and
authority over the disputed lands and waters.3
This challenge to state authority weighed in the balance against the
Tribe, determinatively so for Kennedy. There was an available
state forum, and the vindication of federal law did not outweigh the
challenge to state sovereignty. This challenge to state authority was
determinative for all Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas as well
in their implicit balance. Justice O'Connor explained that
[w]here a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all regulatory
power over submerged lands - in effect, to invoke a federal
305. Id. at 278.
306. Id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
307. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 282.
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court's jurisdiction to quiet title to sovereign lands - it simply
cannot be said that the suit is not a suit against the State.3
In other words, such a suit cannot be "properly characterized" as
seeking prospective relief.
3°
But why not? In effect, the concurring opinion says nothing
more than when the state has a great deal invested in continuing an
ongoing violation of federal law, then a federal court cannot enjoin
that state from doing so. In effect, these three justices engage in
their own implicit balancing of federal interests against the state's
claims of sovereignty. In doing so, these justices suggest that if the
prospective relief will have too great an impact on the state, then
an otherwise perfectly acceptable, traditional Ex parte Young suit
will be barred. The weight of the state's interest is just too great;
this weight tips the balance in favor of the state.
Yet it is just such suits that are most necessary to be resolved
in federal court. If a state is heavily invested in violating federal
law, can a state court be expected to stop that violation? Or put
in concrete and particular terms, what is an essential matter of
sovereignty for Idaho is also an essential matter of sovereignty to
the Couer d'Alene tribe. If sensitivity to Idaho's sovereign pride
precluded a federal forum, can sensitivity to the Tribe's sovereign
pride really allow forcing the tribe into a foreign court? If we are
all one nation, then ought the national courts not stand to resolve
disputes between constituent government entities? When two
sovereign entities within the borders of the United States them-
selves have a border dispute, how could it not be in the "plan of
the Constitutional convention" to have these two submit this
dispute to a federal tribunal?
Only one year before Couer d'Alene, in that other blow to the
rights of the First Nations by way of the Eleventh Amendment, the
decision in Seminole Tribe, the Court assured the nation that its
ruling there did not mean that there were no methods left to
ensure the State's compliance with federal law, in particular, "an
individual can bring suit against a state officer in order to ensure
that the officer's conduct is in compliance with federal law
. .3to Now it is not at all clear that an individual, or even an
308. Id. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
309. See id.
310. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996). The Court
mentioned two other methods of forcing state compliance with federal law. First, the
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injured government, can bring suit against a state officer in order
to ensure compliance with federal law. It all hangs in the balance.
By the time one gets to Couer d'Alene Tribe, one is a far cry
from the Eleventh Amendment's rather simple and explicit
prohibition on one particular application of the party-based
jurisdictional grant in Article III of the Constitution. This is
because, as Justice Kennedy pointed out quite clearly,
The Court's recognition of sovereign immunity has not been
limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. To respect the broader concept of immunity, implicit in
the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amend-
ment as evidencing and exemplifying, we have extended a
State's protection from suit to suits brought by the State's own
citizens. Furthermore, the dignity and respect afforded a State,
which the immunity is designed to protect, are placed in
jeopardy whether or not the suit is based on diversity jurisdic-
tion.3"
The text of the Eleventh Amendment, in other words, has
been replaced with a much broader and largely undefined "con-
cept" which the text only evidences or exemplifies. Since the text
itself cannot supply limits on this "concept," no well-delineated
limits exist. Rather, state's sovereignty replaces the rule of law; no
matter who has a dispute with a state and no matter what the issue,
the "concept" might bar the action. Yet, as Justice Kennedy
recognized, there are countervailing policies; there must be a
"balance of federal and state interests ..... "312 In part, this
balance can be found, according to the newly orthodox wisdom, not
"Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State." Id. This disregards
that some federal laws are made not for the benefit of the federal government but to protect
individual rights or the rights of disadvantaged groups, or to establish the rights of the third
kind of sovereign in our federal system, the "domestic dependent" First Nations, and that
the beneficiaries of the law's protection may want to enforce their rights while the current
federal administration may be hostile, indifferent or simply disagree with the beneficiaries'
view about the scope of the federal protection, as in Cour d'Alene Tribe. The last of the
methods the Court mentioned is the Court's power to review a state court decision that
involves federal law "where a State has consented to suit." Id. This ignores the possibility
that the state may not consent to suit; the significant time and costs involved in litigating all
the way through a hostile state system before seeking review in the Supreme Court, and the
most significant objection, that the Court itself refuses to hear the vast majority of cases
brought to it, and thus a question of federal law significant only to the victim of the state's
violation thereof will never receive a federal hearing.
311. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267-68 (emphasis added).
312. Id. at 277 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986)).
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in the Constitution itself but the plan of the convention that led to
the drafting of the Constitution which was later ratified; and this
"plan" supposedly allows states to sue each other and the United
States to sue states, but not anyone else to do so. Further, the
Young doctrine also exists to give a name to all those circumstances
where the weight of the federal interest requires some limit on the
"broader concept of immunity." What we are left with is an almost
unlimited notion of state sovereignty, a legal territory without
boundaries, except occasional salients carved into that territory to
protect federal interests, salients which themselves have unclear and
shifting boundaries.
What is so frustrating in this balancing of federal and state
interests is the manner in which it reinvents the wheel first
designed by the Constitution's founders. The text of the Constitu-
tion reflects a clear consideration of the federal and state interests,
and lines were drawn. The Eleventh Amendment reflects a
reconsideration of those lines, and a relatively minor adjustment of
the boundaries. If one wants to find the line between conflicting
federal and state interests as these conflicts appear in federal court
jurisdiction, one should not avoid the limits "described in the text
of the Eleventh Amendment." '313 Those limits provide the bound-
aries the Court has spent the last century trying to reinvent.
D. Stare Decisis: Are We Bound to Error?
So far, this Article has not addressed what may appear to be
the strongest argument in favor of current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, or rather the strongest set of arguments. These are
the arguments from precedent-from the argument that stare decisis
requires the Court to give weight to longstanding precedent, all the
way to the argument that constitutional law is not about the written
text at all but the line of decisions to which the text gave rise.
Indeed, there is a convincing argument to be made that most of our
constitutional law is not found in the text written in 1789 and all its
amendments, but in the hundreds of volumes of the United States
Reporter. In other words, the written text is the starting point of
an evolutionary process, and therefore the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is only a starting point as well; Hans v. Louisiana,3 14
313. See id. at 267.
314. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,3t5 and Couer d'Alene
Tribe316 are equally part of what is now the "Eleventh Amend-
ment."
An extreme version of that view, jettisoning the text altogether
except for its role in the history of the evolutionary process, might
make it easier to argue for the constitutional effect this Article
suggests. That argument would go like this: The early development
and extension of state sovereignty exemplifies a principle antitheti-
cal to other principles which have come to be regarded as primary
in our nation, especially when one considers Reconstruction
(shifting the federal-state balance of power), the New Deal (shifting
that balance still more), and the post-war Civil Rights era (focusing
on individual rights and rediscovering the Reconstruction's use of
federal power to protect individual rights). Recent developments
extending state sovereignty have heightened that tension, and that
tension has led to a complex patchwork of fictions and unclear
exceptions. The time has come to begin to simplify the "Eleventh
Amendment" and bring it in line with the principles of the rule of
law, the unity of our nation and the protection of individual
rights.317 What has evolved in the past can continue to evolve;
what veered for a century in one direction can begin to veer in
another.
This Article is not intended, however, as an argument about
the. accuracy of the evolutionary "common law" description of
constitutional lawmaking, nor necessarily as an argument about the
propriety of that approach when evaluated normatively. This
Article has, however, begun with the assumption that the Constitu-
tion (capitalized as the proper name of a document) has some role
in the development of constitutional law (that is, the foundational
law for our legal and political system). Moreover, it has begun
with the assumption that the written text has been putatively been
given great weight by the Court. It does not assume that the
Constitution is a document created by demigods, without blemish
or flaw, nor does it assume a constitutional law is best served by
reliance on a written document. The point only is that we have
315. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
316. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
317. And community rights as well, like the community represented by the Couer
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho.
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one; and having chosen to play that constitutional game, we should
use the document fairly.
Further, this Article does not disagree with the general truism
that, although the Constitution as text has significance, that text
must be read in light of earlier Supreme Court decisions. The
power of precedent is deservedly great in our jurisprudence. Stare
decisis is an important doctrine that carries real weight. Therefore,
it is important to address one argument for the Court's reading of
the Eleventh Amendment which appears to ignore that Amend-
ment's text; the argument that whatever those words may have
meant when written, we cannot ignore the last century's aggressive
expansion of the immunity from suit that Amendment grants the
states. There are two major responses to that argument. First,
stare decisis at most requires that the Court not to diverge from a
prior misreading of the Amendment, but this Court has expanded
the misreading more and more. More fundamentally, however, the
Court itself has cautioned that stare decisis, while important, is not
so important that all other interpretive techniques bow to it.318
The need not to grant too much weight to mistaken precedent
is especially important when matters of constitutional interpretation
are at stake. As the Court reminded us recently in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,319 " 'stare decisis is a principle of policy
and not a mechanical formula... "' and " 'adherence to
precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases .... 321
In fact, as Justice Kennedy (the author of Couer d'Alene Tribe)
reminded all, "[o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct .... In
fact, considerations of stare decisis have less force in constitutional
interpretation than in statutory construction, because errant
precedent can more easily be corrected by legislative action in the
latter case.3 23 Stare decisis is not an " 'inexorable command', and
certainly is not such in every constitutional case.,
324
The role of precedent in constitutional cases that concern the
sovereignty of the states is even less important than other consider-
318. See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
319. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
320. Id. at 231 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
321. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
322. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
323. See id.
324. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,853 (1992)




ations, as is illustrated in a decision from a couple of decades ago,
Oregon v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company.325 That decision
which catches the eye because it happened, like Couer d'Alene
Tribe, to concern the nature of a state's sovereignty over riparian
lands. Corvallis Sand involved an ejectment action by the state of
Oregon against the Corvallis Sand and Gravel Company brought
to determine the ownership of lands that lay under the Willamette
River, which river had shifted its course since Oregon was admitted
to statehood. 26 The Court held that, contrary to what admittedly
were prior decisions, the question was one to be settled under state
law rather than federal common law.327 The majority claimed
that it was overruling a precedent only three years old,3" while
the dissent claimed one hundred forty years of precedent were
brought into question.3 29 Both agreed, however, that stare decisis,
if strictly followed, required a different decision than the one the
Court reached. As then Associate Justice Rehnquist explained in
the Court's opinion, "with an issue substantially related to the
constitutional sovereignty of the States ... considerations of stare
decisis play a less important role .... Precedent that affects
the constitutional sovereignty of the states can cut both ways,
however. While it may be true that precedent that denigrates
states' "sovereignty" should not be given too much weight, neither
should precedent that overstates that sovereignty at the expense of
the federal government, other governments, or the people them-
selves.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Court mentioned some of its criteria for overruling earlier
decisions on constitutional matters.331  For instance, the Court
may ask [1] "whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply
defying practical workability;" [2] "whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the conse-
quences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;"
[3] "whether related principles of law have so far developed as to
325. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
326. See id.
327. See id. at 378-379.
328. See id. at 382. The decision was Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
329. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. at 386 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 381.
331. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). The Court only gave "examples" of what it should
consider, and did not represent that its list was exhaustive.
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have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine;" [4] or "whether facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.""33  These criteria are suspiciously
flexible, and at times tend to be circular. Examining each one
demonstrates both how easily one could apply them to the
Eleventh Amendment as it exists, and how easily manipulated the
criteria are to obtain the desired result. First, is the Eleventh
Amendment intolerably impractical as applied? It is certainly
intolerably complicated, as the brief description of current doctrine
at the beginning of this Article suggests. It is chock full of fictions
and subjective "balancing" tests, for if Couer d'Alene Tribe shows
anything, it shows that Ex parte Young has become nothing more
than an open-ended balancing test. Thus, the very predictability
that is one of the benefits of stare decisis is defeated.
The continued immunity of the states from suits challenging
acts that violate federal law interferes with much of the rest of the
legal principles of the day. As noted elsewhere in this Article, state
sovereign immunity can wreak havoc on patent law.333 It could
dangerously affect copyright protection-are states free to infringe
copyrights at will? State immunity also brings into doubt important
parts of bankruptcy law. 334 Now that Union Gas has been over-
ruled, laws intended to provide adequate environmental protection
and remediation of past harms have been weakened severely; states
are major landowners and states' activities can affect water and air
quality and can poison the land in innumerable ways. Precedent,
based in the first instance on a poor reading of the Constitutional
text and with such bad effects, surely is not to be given too much
weight.
In any case, such bad precedent need not have been extended
in recent years as took place in the trilogy of First Nations' cases
discussed above (one of which itself overruled notable precedent
when the Seminole Tribe Court overruled Union Gas). The Court
has so complicated its state sovereignty doctrine that it may have
332. Id. (citations omitted).
333. See infra Section VII.A.2.
334. See, e.g., In re Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is unconstitutional, thus prohibiting
debtor hospital from obtaining a declaratory judgment that the state owed it money under




created, by accident, a golden opportunity to reexamine the whole
superstructure. It would not be too untoward of the Court to say
that now, with the Eleventh Amendment in conceptual disarray, it
is time to look again to the words actually written in the Constitu-
tion.
VII. The Implications of Infidelity
A. The Eleventh Amendment in Turmoil
At this point it is worth taking a breath to see what state
sovereign immunity looks like now, after the recent expansion of
the parallel Eleventh Amendment and the reduction of those
doctrines that ameliorate the harm that the parallel Amendment
does. The Eleventh Amendment, it was argued above,335 was a
modification of two of Article III's ten bases of jurisdiction. In
other words, the sixth basis of jurisdiction was amended from "[t]he
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equi-
ty,... between a State and Citizens of another State;" to add "but
not when the suit is commenced or prosecuted by Citizens of
another State."
Similarly, the tenth basis of jurisdiction was amended from
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equi-
ty, ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign ... Citizens or Subjects" to add, "but not suits commenced or
prosecuted by foreign Citizens or Subjects against a State.
336
Of the ten potential bases of federal jurisdiction in Article III,
however, there are in fact not two but as many as seven that might
involve actions against a state.337  Now, after Hans, Monaco, and
Blatchford, of these seven, only two have definitely escaped the
parallel Eleventh Amendment.338
335. See supra Section III.B.
336. But remember that Principality of Monaco further reduced the scope of this ninth
basis of jurisdiction.
337. The only one of the ten bases of jurisdiction found in Article 111, Section 2, clause
1 that logically cannot include a state as a party defendant is the seventh, "between Citizens
of different States," the true diversity of citizenship basis for federal jurisdiction. See U.S.
CONST, art. III, § 1, cl. 1. The two others that probably would never give rise to cases in
which a state is a party are jurisdictional basis [2], cases affecting ambassadors, consuls and
public ministers, and jurisdictional basis [8], cases between persons who claim land under
grants from two different states.
338. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 & 785 (1991)
(recognizing [tihe consent, "inherent in the convention," to suit by the United States - at the
instance and under the control of responsible federal officers - and also recognizing a
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At this point, then, asking the reader's forebearance, the list
of federal jurisdictional bases are set forth again at length; those
which have been in some way affected by the Eleventh Amend-
ment are in large and small capitals; those under which, despite the
Eleventh Amendment, a state might still be made a defendant are
italicized; and those which (probably) cannot involve a state as a
party are left in normal print:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
[1] ARISING UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND TREATIES MADE, OR WHICH SHALL BE
MADE, UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY;- [2] to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;339 - [3] TO
ALL CASES OF ADMIRALITY AND MARITIME JURISDIC-
TION;-[4] to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party;3 °---[5] to Controversies between two or more
States;-[6] BETWEEN A STATE AND CITIZENS OF ANOTHER
STATE;-[7] between Citizens of different States;-[8] between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, [9] AND BETWEEN A STATE, OR THE CITIZENS
THEREOF, AND FOREIGN STATES, [10] [OR FOREIGN] CITIZENS
OR SUBJECTS. 1
"mutuality of concession" allowing suits between states). See id.
339. It may, however, be simply a failure of imagination to find this basis of jurisdiction
is one that does not involve states a potential defendants.
340. This list takes a conservative approach, but it is possible that a case could arise
where the result shown - a clause where a state can still be made a defendant - is wrong. See
the discussion below.
341. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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Compare that list with the one reproduced before 32 and one can
see how far the parallel Eleventh Amendment has come.
Going through the list of those undoubtedly affected by the
parallel Eleventh Amendment, the first item on the list is also the
most important, cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority." That is no longer a basis for bringing a
state into federal court for the entire century since Hans. Now, as
Seminole Tribe demonstrated, even if it is clear Congress believed
such suits were needed to enforce federal law's supremacy, the
Court simply cannot hear federal question jurisdiction cases against
the state.
Another basis of jurisdiction that appears preeminently federal
is its admirality jurisdiction, the third in the list of ten federal bases
of jurisdiction in Article 111.34 The recent history of that basis
for federal judicial power over states shows how confusing the
Eleventh Amendment has become. Article III states that "[t]he
[federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity,... [3] to all Cases of admirality and maritime Jurisdiction;
Early cases involving the federal court's admirality
jurisdiction, at least when that jurisdiction is in rem, adjudicating,
for example, the disposition of the bounty of prize vessels taken in
war, held that the Eleventh Amendment had no effect on that
jurisdiction. 45 Thus the federal court could adjudicate such cases
342. See supra note 116 and accompanying text, showing Article III as the text would be
read if the Eleventh Amendment directly edited the text rather than following the
convention of "amendment by addition." For convenience sake, that version of Article III
is here reproduced:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, [1] arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-[2] to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-[3] to all Cases of admirality and maritime
Jurisdiction;-[4] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;--[5] to Controversies between two or more States;--[6] between a State
and Citizens of another State; but it shall not be construed to extend to any suit
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State,-[7] between Citizens of different States;-[8] between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, [9] and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, [10] [or foreign] Citizens or Subjects, but
it shall not be construed to extend to any suit commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
343. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (Cranch) 115 (1809).
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even when a state raised an objection. For instance, in 1809 Justice
Washington held that in admirality cases the federal court has
possession of the res in question, and must decide the title to it
against all claims, so "[aIll the world are parties to such a suit, and
of course bound by the sentence.'3 46  The world so bounded
includes states: a "state may interpose her claim and have it
decided. But she cannot lie by, and, after the decree is passed say
that she was a party, and therefore not bound, for want of
jurisdiction in the court." '347
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, which were quite
influential in the nineteenth century, Justice Story explained why,
in his view, the Eleventh Amendment did not extend to in rem
admirality cases:
the jurisdiction of the court is founded upon the possession of
the thing; and if the State should interpose a claim for the
property, it does not act merely in the character of a defendant,
but as an actor. Besides, the language of the amendment is,
that 'the judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity.' But a suit in
admirality is not, correctly speaking, a suit in law or in equity;
but is often spoken of in contradistinction to both.'
Story's rationale seems a bit weak to holders of the current view
that the words of the Amendment capture only the tip of the
iceberg of the sovereign immunity states retain. Indeed, in Florida
Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. the Court held that a
federal court may not undertake in rem adjudication of a State's
interest in property without the "State's consent. ' ' "4 In fact, in
Couer d'Alene Tribe Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion cited
Treasure Salvors for the proposition that "[a] federal court cannot
summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest the
State of a property interest.""35 After all, both cases were in a
sense actions in rem, and their very purpose therefore was to divest
all, including the state, of any claim of title in property.
Yet in Treasure Salvors the state lost. The Court concluded
that state officials lacked any colorable bases under state law for
346. United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1236 (C.C. Pa. 1809).
347. Id.; see also Peters, 9 U.S. at 139-141.
348. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 491-
492 (5th ed. 1891).
349. See Florida Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 682 (1982).
350. Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997).
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claiming possession of the property in dispute (artifacts of a sunken
ship).35 Thus, the Court seems to have held that the Eleventh
Amendment bars actions under the admirality jurisdiction that
might affect a state claim, unless that state claim is not colorable-a
result that seems far afield from a simple restriction of what sort of
cases the courts can hear, and totally unrelated to the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. It is clear that, if the res is in the possession
of the state, however that possession came about, and that state's
claim is in any way colorable, the Eleventh Amendment would as
now interpreted necessarily bar the federal courts from hearing the
claim. The result is that admirality jurisdiction must be added to
the list of the Article III bases of jurisdiction affected by the
Eleventh Amendment.
Oddly enough, not long after the Couer d'Alene Tribe Court
cited Treasure Salvors the Court found reason to question Treasure
Salvors itself. In 1998, the Court decided California and State
Lands Commission v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.352 That case arose
out of a shipwreck off the coast of California in 1865, the SS
Brother Jonathan.353 Deep Sea Research, Inc. ("DSR"), located
the wreck of that ship.354 After investing in initial salvage efforts,
DSR filed an action in federal court under that court's in rem
admiralty jurisdiction seeking rights in the wreck.355 California
intervened, asserting a right under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
of 1987.356 That claim, unlike the one in Treasure Salvors, ap-
peared to be at least colorable.
In response, the Court added a touch more complexity to its
analysis. It recast Treasure Salvors to have "a more nuanced
application., 35 7 If an action is in rem under the federal admirality
jurisdiction, and the property in question is in the hands of state
officials, the federal court must examine how colorable the state's
claim is-because if it is not a colorable claim, the state officials
holding the property were acting without authority and thus a
judgment would not "really" be against the state.358 On the other
351. See Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 682.
352. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
353. See id.
354. See id. at 494.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 506.




hand, should the res not be in the possession of the state, the
Eleventh Amendment simply is not implicated at all.359
Again, Occam's razor cries out for use. A contextual reading
of the Eleventh Amendment, which simply trusted the words and
structure of the Constitution, would have reached the same result-
California could be bound by the federal court's ruling on title to
the salvage from the S.S. Brother Jonathan-but would not have
needed such a complex superstructure to reach that result.
The turmoil that exists in the Eleventh Amendment comes not
only from the increasingly expansive scope of the Amendment,
unbounded by the text. Even more of that turbulence comes but
also from the increasingly complex nature and tentative efficacy of
the ameliorative doctrines intended to provide some safe haven for
the Supremacy Clause from the destructive force of that expansive
Amendment. It is clear that these ameliorative doctrines provide
less protection than once was the case, but it is less clear what in
fact their boundaries even are.
1. The Future of Ex parte Young-The future of Ex parte
Young is dubious and clouded after Couer d'Alene Tribe. If Justice
Kennedy's opinion forecasts the future of Ex parte Young, that
decision's import will be reinterpreted beyond recognition, and
probably beyond much practical utility. On the other hand, if the
concurring opinion represents (as it probably does) the Court's
center of gravity on the issue, Ex parte Young still has been
severely restricted by an "I know it when I see it" balancing test.
At the very least, Ex parte Young's boundaries have become fuzzier
and less comprehensible than before, and as a consequence, the
Eleventh Amendment as a whole has become still less comprehen-
sible and less predictable than before.
2. The Possible Future of Abrogation-The abrogation
doctrine in the lower courts is not as moribund as one might expect
after Seminole Tribe. While not a ringing endorsement, that
portion of a sentence in a long textual footnote does seem to leave
in place abrogation when the statute was passed under the
Fourteenth Amendment. That doctrine's continued life, however,
while giving hope to litigants, only increases the confusion over the
Eleventh Amendment. In a footnote of its opinion, after all, the
359. See id. at 506-07.
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Seminole Tribe Court in passing mentioned that "in the context of
a statute passed under the Fourteenth Amendment... Congress's
authority to abrogate is undisputed."3"
Courts already have begun to push into the narrow gap that
footnote fifteen of Seminole Tribe left open. One recent example
is found in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board,361 a case that appears to raise one
abrogation issue but in fact raised another. In that case, the
plaintiff sued Florida for patent infringement, seeking remedies
under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act (Patent Remedy Act).362 The Constitution granted to
Congress the power
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
363
The Patent Remedy Act clearly arises under that power, and under
the pre-Seminole Tribe, post-Union Gas abrogation regime, it
would appear completely reasonable that the Patent Clause allows
the Congress to abrogate state immunity. In fact, the Patent
Remedy Act specifically and explicitly subjects states to patent
infringement suits, and specifically explains the state "shall not be
immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity
.... "36 After Seminole Tribe, however, abrogation under the
Patent Clause was not available, because that clause preexisted the
Eleventh Amendment. The College Savings Bank court was not
dismayed, however. It found mention of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the legislative history of the Act; it reasoned that the Due
Process Clause of that Amendment protects property rights; patents
are property rights; and thus state action violating patent rights
violate due process.365 Therefore, the Patent Remedy Act arises
under the Fourteenth Amendment and its abrogation of state
sovereign immunity arises under that Amendment as weln.36
360. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996).
361. 148 F.3d 1343 (3d. 1998).
362. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h) & 296 (1994).
363. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
364. See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a).




The College Savings Bank case reached the Supreme Court in its
1998-99 term. At the very end of that term on June 23, 1999, the
Court sided with the state and struck down the Patent Remedy
Act.
367
B. Reflections on State Sovereignty
Given the Court's explicit insistence that one must look
beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment to "broader con-
cepts," one question that always exists in any act of constitutional
interpretation becomes more insistent. What is the nature of this
concept of state sovereign immunity, what is its value, and how
does it fit in the broader scheme of principles and values our law
enforces? At first blush, the principle might seem simple enough,
with practical value and even, to an extent, a protection for the
citizens at large. Exempting governments from some suits protects
their treasuries from being spent on attorneys fees and paying
judgments, which in turn means that taxpayers will not see their
taxes lost on lawsuits. After all, any time a government is sued, the
citizens who support that government with their taxes are also sued.
That fact makes a difference. The law needs to recognize that
difference-but that difference between a suit against private
individuals and a suit against a government exists not only for
states but counties, cities, and all other sorts of local governments.
After all, the taxpayer protection rationale is that it does not
explain the privileged position accorded to state immunity. That
principle does not protect the treasuries of such state created
subordinate governments, like counties and municipalities, and
those governments can suffer huge judgments and pay immense
amounts of money in attorneys fees.368 The courts and Congress
together have worked toward appropriate protection of the
taxpayer's purse in these situations without resorting to talk of the
"dignity and respect" due to a sovereign369 and without creating
wholesale immunity from suit. The same could be done for states.
The principle of state sovereign immunity is about more than
the arguably reasonable principle of protecting taxpayers' money.
It is about the special status of states qua states in our system. The
367. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Board, 119
S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
368. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
369. See Idaho v.Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997).
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current tendency is to exaggerate that status unnecessarily. What
limited sovereign immunity the Constitution actually grants to the
states must be respected; but there is no good reason to grant the
states any more. The tendency to do more is based more on an
almost counter-historical metaphysics than the requirements of our
Constitutional system.
The nature of that metaphysics is to assume that there is a
thing called "sovereignty" that can and does reside in political
entities and which must be respected. At times that view is easier
to justify than others. For instance, the author of this Article
currently resides in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a
governmental entity with a history as "Pennsylvania" that extends
back more than a century before the Declaration of Independence
or any other ready reference date for the creation of the United
States. Pennsylvania was one of the original thirteen states. It sent
representatives to the Constitutional Convention and its ratification
was needed to put the Constitution into effect. When one looks
solely at that history, it is easy to understand the view that states
are "sovereigns""37 that had an independent existence apart from
the United States of America and retain all incidents of that
sovereignty unless surrendered in the "plan of the convention"-
although the breadth of what was surrendered seems to remain a
matter of controversy.
That view, however, is conveniently parochial, and an open-
eyed look at historical facts make it seem rather strained. To be
specific, the author of this Article was not raised in Pennsylvania,
but Oklahoma. At the time of the Declaration of Independence,
most of Oklahoma was the Spanish territory of Louisiana (formerly
French, then, a few year later, briefly French again). A small part
of Oklahoma was part of the Spanish colony of Mexico. A few
decades after the formation of the United States, that country, in
its capacity as a single nation, purchased and then claimed to own
the greater portion of Oklahoma, through the Louisiana Purchase.
A few more decades later, Anglo-American settlers in the northern
province of the now-independent Mexico, Texas, in turn fought for
and claimed independence; then sought admission to the Union,
and gave up a bit of territory to the Union as a whole in the
process-and some of that territory became part of what is now
370. Setting aside utility of that concept at the dawn of the twenty-first century. See
Prince, supra note 218, at 107-10.
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Oklahoma as well. Thereafter, Congress, using its exclusive power
to deal with the indigenous nations and its exclusive power of
territory owned by the United States but not part of any individual
state, made Oklahoma into Indian Territory for several decades,
with no pretensions of ever becoming a state. Oklahoma Territory,
as a future state, was not organized until 1889, out of lands taken
from the various First Nations of Indian Territory as "surplus."
The state did not come into being (by joining Indian Territory and
Oklahoma Territory into one unit) until the first decade of the
twentieth century. One can talk all one wants about the "equal
footing" doctrine and treating created states like the original
thirteen,37' but the fact is thirty-seven of the states exist, not as
sovereigns which surrendered some of that sovereignty in the "plan
of the convention," but as creations of the federal government.
Indeed, the federal government, pursuant to its overarching
sovereignty, has dismembered an original state, creating West
Virginia from Virginia. Thus, apart from the revolutionary change
implied by the Civil War and Reconstruction in the relationship
between state and federal governments, the ongoing fact that has
existed since the beginning of this nation is that by and large the
latter created the former.
The very notion of sovereignty is a dangerous abstraction.372
In practice, most claims for state sovereignty are prompted by
dubious motives. After all, in 1957, when the Mississippi state
legislature created what it called "the Sovereignty Commission,"
with the stated purpose of performing "acts... necessary ... to
protect the sovereignty of the State of Mississippi ... from
encroachment... by the Federal Government," '373 the legislature
meant a commission intended to undermine the implementation of
desegregation, gather information about civil rights activists and to
infiltrate and spy on the activities of desegregationists. 74 In fact,
this Sovereignty Commission aided Byron De la Beckwith in
choosing a sympathetic jury when he was first put on trial for the
murder of the state's NAACP head, Medgar Evers.
75
371. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (establishing the equal footing
doctrine).
372. See Prince, supra note 218, at 107-110.
373. MISS. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-11 (West 1972) (repealed 1977).
374. See, e.g., ACLU of Mississippi v. King, 84 F.3d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1997).
375. See De la Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 566 (Miss. 1997).
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Of course it is not logically necessary that a claim for state
sovereignty be a cover for another goal which one would be
embarrassed to announce in a straightforward way. That is simply
the most common reason to advocate state power-as for example,
it is more palatable to talk about "state's rights" than racism,
3 76
cultural imperialism377 or a desire to sacrifice environmental
protection to promote economic exploitation.378  Ultimately,
however, in any discussion of sovereignty, we must remember what
Justice Wilson explained in Chisolm v. Georgia, that under our
constitutional scheme "there is but one place where [the term
"sovereign"] could have been used with propriety"-in conjunction
with the term the "people of the United States." '379 Any claims
of state sovereignty must be weighed against its effects on popular
sovereignty. State sovereign immunity is especially vulnerable to
criticism for its damage to popular sovereignty, at least if we are
willing to look at the people as more than a large abstract mass but
rather as an entity that is built one person at a time, and that each
of these persons have rights that cannot be sacrificed.
Sovereignty, after all, is not a zero sum game. Any power
granted to the state or any other person or entity is a loss of power
to some other person or entity. State power and states' "rights"
are often contrasted with federal power; but in many cases,
especially the case of the principle of sovereign immunity, it is the
power of citizens that is lost. Sovereign immunity, as the parallel
Eleventh Amendment, does not really limit federal power at all-if
it feels it needs to do so, the federal government can bring suit
against a state in the federal government's home ground, the
federal courts. It is the citizen that is deprived of her remedy
against the state.
C. The Rest of the Constitution-Present and Future
Apart from the affect of the parallel Eleventh Amendment on
enforcement of federal law, including constitutional law, the
376. For example, the racism behind the states rights rhetoric of the 1960s.
377. For example, the cultural imperialism behind much of the discussion of states rights
as opposed to the rights of the First Nations.
378. See, e.g., the state's position in EPA v. Montana, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 275 (1998) (the state argued that it, not the Flathead Reservation tribal
government, should control water quality on the reservation simply because some of that
reservation was owned by non-tribal members).
379. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 454 (1798).
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method by which the parallel Eleventh Amendment was achieved
can affect the rest of the Constitution as well. The method of
ignoring specific textual commands to search for the principles
those commands exemplify (a technique not to be confused with
following open-ended textual commands to seek out broader
principles) has troubling implications. The implications of that
method are especially troubling when one considers the variety of
new constitutional amendments that have been proposed in recent
years.
For instance, a "Religious Freedom Amendment," 380 allow-
ing the display of religious symbols on public property and the use
of public funds for religious education, as well as making school
prayer easier, and a "Victims Rights Amendment"''  both have
been brought to the floor of Congress in recent years. Some are
troubled by these proposed amendments simply because of a
justifiable caution about amending the Constitution. Some are
more specifically troubled, however, at proposal that appear to
change the scope of rights granted to individuals against govern-
mental interference (in the First Amendment's religion clauses, in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and perhaps also the Eighth Amendments'
protections for those accused of crimes).382 It is at least arguable
that these proposed amendments restrict some individual rights,
making them the first proposed amendments to do so.383 Discus-
sion of these proposed amendments often has turned on rather
380. See Chris Black, How to Vote on School Prayer Amendment, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
June 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9136920 (describing vote on amendment taking place on
June 6, 1998). The article includes the text of the Amendment:
To secure the people's right to acknowledge God according to the dictates of
conscience: Neither the United States nor any State shall establish any official
religion, but the people's right to pray and to recognize their religious beliefs,
heritage or traditions on public property, including schools, shall not be infringed.
Neither the United States nor any State shall require any person to join in prayer
or other religious activity, prescribe school prayers, discriminate against religion,
or deny equal access to a benefit on account of religion.
See id. (citing the text of the proposed amendment).
381. See, e.g., Marlene A. Young & Roger Pilon, Symposium, WASHINGTON TIMES of
August 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3457102, 3457095 (describing the proposed
amendment).
382. See, e.g., Robert Fichenberg, The Controversial Victims' Rights Amendment,
PROSECUTOR, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 38; William W. Taylor, III, Victims' Rights and the
Constitution: Proceed With Caution, PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 12.
383. That is, unless one reads the Sixteenth Amendment to allow an income tax as a
restriction of individual economic rights, and the now repealed Eighteenth Amendment as
a restriction on the individual's right to consume alcohol.
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close textual analysis of their wording, with advocates pointing out
that the commands are quite specific and intended to preserve the
full scope of individual rights available under the extant Bill of
Rights.384
What, however, is to be done if the proposed amendments are
enacted, but future Supreme Courts read them, not for the specific
commands written in them, but for the implicit principles the
amendments merely are "evidencing and exemplifying?" '385
Would the Religious Freedom Amendment exemplify a commit-
ment to theism as more American than atheism?386 Would that
amendment exemplify a desire to inculcate the right sort of theism
in Americans? Would it exemplify the principle that theists, being
more American than others, should be treated more favorably than
others by American governments?
Whatever the answer to these questions, should the Court use
the same interpretive technique toward these potential amendments
as it has for the Eleventh Amendment, the debate cannot be
answered by reference to the amendments themselves. In the
example of the Religious Freedom Amendment, school prayer and
public support of religious displays and education could be taken
as just powerful examples of the greater deference government
should pay religion (and at that, religion of a specific kind,
inasmuch as many religious traditions eschew public ritual
prayer)." The opposite pole of religious freedom, being free
from religious establishment, would necessarily be read using the
opposite interpretive technique, where the Establishment Clause's
broad and abstract wording would be transformed into a limited set
of specific prohibitions one plausibly could speculate would have
been acceptable to the rich white men that wrote the Constitution.
For example, states could not actually pay ministers with tax
money; just subsidize the church's school, leaving more money
available to pay the ministers. Similarly, the proposed "Victims
384. See, e.g., Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The Proposed Crime Victims'
Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REV.
1 (1997).
385. The reader may by now recognize this sentence as a paraphrase of the language in
Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997).
386. The author's impression is that many who advocate such an amendment would not
hesitate to say that it is more American to be a theist, and specifically, a Christian theist,
than anything else.
387. See, e.g., Mary Pennington, I Durst Not Mock Him With A Form, in Jessamyn West,
THE QUAKER READER, 133-34 (1962).
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Rights Amendment" raises questions about what "broader
concepts" it might be intended to "exemplify." That amendment
was proposed "to bring fairness to the criminal justice system by
equalizing the constitutional rights between victims and the
accused."3" 9  That goal follows from the perception that the
accused enjoys greater rights than the victim.390 Of course, that
is because the accused is the one against whom the power and
machinery of the state is arrayed; the victim may feel the state has
not done enough for her, but she is not the object of the state's
oppression. Be that as it may, the proponents of the amendment
have argued its language, discussed unforeseen consequences, and
in theory tried not to have the new set of victim's rights adversely
impact the old set of accused's rights.391
Should the Court apply the same jurisprudential technique to
the Victim's Rights Amendment as it has to the Eleventh Amend-
ment, however, the proponents of the former need not bother to be
so careful. No matter how one circumscribes victims rights, the
very notion that they have rights that must be equal to the
accused's suggests a balancing, and once the Court begins to
balance the rights of the accused against the rights of the victims,
there can be no limitation on what the Court will do to the rights
of the accused found in such places as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh and even Eighth Amendments. Once the Court begins to
ignore the text of the Victims' Rights Amendment except as it
exemplifies implicit principles broader than the text, nothing about
a citizen's rights when the machinery of the state is arrayed against
her can be taken as safe.
Overall, the Court's rather contrarian approach to the text of
the Constitution creates problems for potential amendment
drafters. If the proposed amendment is drafted in broad terms,
inviting an open-ended search for a richer, fuller reading (an
example might be the late lamented Equal Rights Amendment),
the Court may refuse to engage in that search. Instead, the
drafters might anticipate that in the distant future, when circum-
stances have changed in all sorts of way and new understandings of
human affairs exist, the future Court will insist on limiting the text
388. For the text of that amendment, see 143 CONG. REC. S163 (1997).
389. Kathleen Kalaher, Note, The Proposed Victim's Rights Amendment: Taking a Bite
Out of Crime or a Dog With No Teeth?, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 317, 322 (1997).
390. See id. at 321.
391. See Barajas & Nelson, supra note 384, at 16-19.
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to what that Court thinks the stereotypical, largely mythical late
twentieth century "framer" of the amendment thought it would
accomplish in late twentieth century society. On the other hand,
if the proposed amendment is drafted in specific terms, limiting its
effect to certain delineated areas-if the proposed amendment is
written not to be evolutionary but to adjust a particular problem
that appears to have arisen in some particular part of the constitu-
tional structure-the Court might launch into a discussion of
principles the amendment exemplifies.
Perhaps the Court's contrarian jurisprudence, ignoring the text
just as that text makes specific demands, is limited only to specific
demands that the Court thinks is absurd or anomalous. After all,
once it made the decision to interpret the Eleventh Amendment
acontextually, the Court found that the Amendment had absurd
results. It should always be remembered, however, that one court's
absurdity is another's obviously just result.
392
In sum, the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence ought
to trouble anyone who places value on textual fidelity. To be
faithful to the text requires that it be read carefully, in full, in
context, and with sensitivity to the different tones of voice the text
uses. The acontextual reading of the Eleventh Amendment shows
how easy it can be to take bits and pieces of even a relatively short
text like the United States Constitution and read those bits and
pieces out of context, getting wildly inappropriate results. The
subsequent development of the parallel Eleventh Amendment, and
the concomitant complex patchwork of ameliorative doctrines to
counterbalance that parallel Amendment, show how quickly the
Court can abandon any pretext of textual fidelity when the Court
does not like the results fidelity would bring.
VIII. Conclusion
Throughout this Article the implicit assumption has been that
fidelity to the text is important in Constitutional adjudication. That
may not always be true; but when the time comes to say the text
of what was written simply no longer applies, but that decisions
must be made on matters of fundamental constitutional issues, it
392. See discussion supra page 69 comparing what was absurd to the court in Hans v.
Louisiana and what seemed just to Justice Kennedy in Couer d'Alene Tribe.
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should be said honestly.393 Otherwise, having entered into a
communal compact to constitute our polity through a written
document, we should respect that text. Respect for the text means,
among other things, being sensitive to its differing approaches-on
matters of structure, it is often quite specific, while on other
matters, it speaks in open-ended language inviting evolution and
forcing one to look well beyond the text itself in order to be
faithful to that text's commands.
When the text gives specific commands, such as the require-
ment that the President be a natural-born citizen, we when acting
as lawyers, and the Court when acting as a court of law, has no
choice but to be bound. It is entirely conceivable that the best
person for the position of President might be some highly promi-
nent public servant whose parents brought her here from another
country as immigrants. It is conceivable that the Court's members
would believe her to be the best candidate for the job, and further
believe the Constitutional text reflect an unhealthy xenophobia.
The Court is not bound to enforce the implicit principle of
xenophobia that one can read in the text; but it is bound not to let
her take the oath of office of President should that case come
before it.
The Eleventh Amendment is such a specific command, a
purposeful limitation of some of the grants of jurisdiction given to
the federal courts in Article III of the Constitution less than a
decade before the Eleventh Amendment was ratified. Although
specific, the Amendment is equivocal; it has two plausible readings.
The "acontextual" reading, which reads the Amendment to bar all
suits against states by persons who happen to be citizens of other
states or nations, and the "contextual" reading, which only bars
suits against states in which federal jurisdiction is grounded solely
in diversity of citizenship. To adopt the latter would be to obey the
text, achieve results that are sensible and allow the Constitutional
plan of popular sovereignty and federal supremacy to come to
393. Our constitutional law has been forced to leave the text behind on more than one
occasion. For example, the Louisiana Purchase and other, later territorial acquisitions simply
are not matters that the text deals with, one way or the other; and the proper way to restore
states to the Union after they try to secede is a matter entirely outside the scope of the
Constitution, and it was one issue the Civil War Amendments that adjusted the Constitution
so radically chose to ignore. Yet both these matters could not be ignored. In dealing with




fruition. Unfortunately, the Court has adopted the former reading,
the "acontextual" reading, which yielded results it found absurd,
opening the door to a wholesale abandonment of the text and the
development of the "parallel" Eleventh Amendment.
Perhaps the reader is unconvinced, however, that what this
Article has called the "contextual" reading of the Eleventh
Amendment is a sound one based on the reader's views about the
right way to read the words. Even if that is the case, though, the
current "parallel" Amendment is equally unfounded in the text. If
one must choose a reading ungrounded in the text, does it not
make sense to choose that reading that best serves the Supremacy
Clause, the rule of law, and notions of popular sovereignty?
The larger question for constitutional jurisprudence is whether,
having made a commitment to a text as a commonly accepted basis
for structuring a polity, abandoning that text altogether to search
for principles or "intent" is ever a good idea. If we choose that
road, perhaps it would be better to abandon any pretext of a
written Constitution altogether, and follow the relatively successful
British model of a common law constitution. If we are not
prepared to do so, however, it would be best for us to return to a
faithful and sensitive reading of the words of the written Constitu-
tion. The more respect we show the lyrics the more likely it is we
will sing the right song.
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